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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of the relationship between institutions of democracy and 
societal norms has long troubled legal scholars. The view that 
constitutional rights operate against the state but do not permeate the 
private sphere or private law has been subject to waves of devastating 
criticism.
1
 Critics attack what has come to be known as the vertical 
 
 
  B.A., LL.B., LL.M. (University of Witwatersrand); LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard Law School). 
This Article has benefited from the exceptionally generous comments of Frank Michelman. It was 
completed during my stay as a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International and Comparative Law, 
University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Virginia Gordon for the institution‘s support. All 
errors are mine alone. 
 1. The literature critiquing the divide between the public sphere and private law is extensive. 
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application of human rights.
2
 The verticalist position is based on the 
understanding that power imbalances experienced in the relationship 
between citizen and state in the public sphere are not replicated in the 
private sphere and its governing law, the common law.
3
 Coupled with this 
is the commitment to a conception of the common law as innocuous 
background law based on freedom and neutrality.
4
 The United States‘ state 
action doctrine has come to represent the archetypal verticalist approach to 
constitutional rights.
5
  
More recently, an alternative approach has come to prominence—the 
horizontal application of rights—which signifies that constitutional rights 
can permeate the private sphere and the common law.
6
 Horizontal 
application has been adopted in various forms by the EU and by several 
countries, including Canada, Germany, Ireland, and most importantly for 
the purpose of this paper, South Africa.
7
  
Yet it would be a mistake to characterize verticality or horizontality in 
any absolutist manner, since there are degrees of horizontality both 
between and within legal traditions. For instance, it is worth noting that 
even within the verticalist tradition of the United States, there are powerful 
pockets of horizontal application evident in the decisions of Shelley v. 
Kraemer
8
 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
9
 Similarly, the variation in 
 
 
The earliest critics, the American legal realists, paved the way for subsequent schools of criticism. For 
a sampling of their literature, see Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 488–89 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 
CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12–14 (1927); Louis Jaffe, Lawmaking by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 
(1937). See also MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (2d ed. 1992). 
 2. See Frank I. Michelman, On the Uses of Interpretive ‘Charity’: Some Notes on Application, 
Avoidance, Equality and Objective Unconstitutionality from the 2007 Term of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa, 1 CONST. CT. REV. 1, 6 n.17 (2008). 
 3. See generally Michelle Parlevliet, Berghof Research Ctr. for Constructive Conflict Mgmt., 
Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective 3 (2009), http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/documents/publications/parlevliet_handbook.pdf. 
 4. See Frank I. Michelman, The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly 
State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401, 419 (2003) (discussing conceptions of common law as facilitative 
rather than regulatory). 
 5. United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149 (1978); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See also Frank I. 
Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063 (2000); Mark Tushnet, The Issue 
of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 79 (2003); 
Michelman, supra note 4; Stephen Gardbaum, Where the (State) Action Is, 4 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 760 
(2006). 
 6. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 7. See infra notes 10–12. See also Gardbaum, supra note 5, for a comprehensive discussion of 
comparative application jurisprudence. 
 8. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court held that ―state action in violation of the Amendment‘s 
provisions is equally repugnant to the constitutional commands whether directed by state statute or 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/4
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degrees of horizontal application between systems ranges from models of 
direct horizontal application
10
 to the more prevalent positions adopted in 
Canada
11
 and Germany
12
 of indirect horizontal application. In those 
countries, constitutional norms operate frontally or directly when 
government actors are involved, but indirectly influence the interpretation 
of doctrine rather than overrule it in cases involving non-state actors. The 
implication here is that the more indirect judicial intervention is, the less 
encroachment there will be on the system of common law and individual 
liberty. A great deal is thought to be at stake in this distinction between 
direct and indirect horizontal application and what it might signify. 
Arguably, it is the most contentious issue in the contemporary application 
debate.  
This Article will argue, through a detailed chronological study of South 
African case law, that the application debates, which have taken the 
outward form of disputes over the choice between direct and indirect 
horizontal application and exactly how to understand the difference, 
amount to very little in the end. In fact, indirect application sometimes 
leads to more radical intrusion of judges in the private sphere, while direct 
application often comes to signify judicial unwillingness or inability to 
intervene. Ultimately, attempting to distinguish instances of direct from 
indirect application in case law becomes an intractable exercise.
13
 
 
 
taken by a judicial official in the absence of statute.‖ Id. at 16. 
 9. 376 U.S 254 (1964). The Court decided that the law of defamation in Alabama 
unconstitutionally impaired the right of freedom of speech. Id. at 264–65. 
 10. See the Irish case, C. M. v. T. M., [1991] I.L.R.M. 268 (Ir.), in which Judge Barr held that 
the common law doctrine determining that a wife‘s domicile is dependent on that of her husband was 
inconsistent with the principles of equality before the law and equality between husband and wife that 
are embodied in articles 40 and 41 of the Irish Constitution. Id. See also JAMES CASEY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND (2d ed. 1992). 
 11. Retail, Wholesale & Dep‘t Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
573 (Can.). 
 12. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 198 (F.R.G.). See also DAVID P. CURRIE, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 181–89 (1994). 
 13. Nevertheless in the pages that follow, I attempt to classify various judgments as being 
instances or purported instances of direct and indirect application. My classifications of the judgments 
are based on the original or ―classic‖ conception of the difference between direct and indirect 
applications and what the two distinct methodologies were originally designed to achieve. My 
characterization of the judgments, like the distinction itself, is tenuous, since ultimately both direct and 
indirect applications lead to the same remedy—development of the common law. Hence, the 
classification exercise is a fraught one. In a remarkable article, Professor Frank Michelman argues that 
the South African Constitutional Court operates on an altered application paradigm that departs from 
the original conception of the distinction, but that arguably, nothing of substance rests on the 
distinction. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 8, for a synopsis of the altered Constitutional Court 
paradigm. 
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However, the debates are still vitally important because they are the site of 
overlapping conflict among divergent conceptions of common law 
baselines, constitutional text and purposes, and the appropriate 
relationships among the following five institutional sources of normative 
legal authority in South Africa: the drafters of the Constitution, the current 
South African Government and Parliament, South African society at large, 
the Constitutional Court, and the common law judiciary.  
By way of thematic introduction, I will outline some of the myriad, 
disparate ways in which the application clauses have functioned within 
South African common law and customary law jurisprudence. The 
academic advocates of indirect application were particularly concerned 
with distinguishing judicial from legislative lawmaking, a position that 
had deep resonance in the Apartheid-era system of parliamentary 
sovereignty that was predicated on the supremacy of legislative will.
14
 
Correspondingly, in pre-constitutional common law discourse, judges 
maintained that they ―made‖ law in the rarest circumstances.15 The case 
law dealing with boni mores, community norms, was an instance of 
unmasked judicial lawmaking where the common law judicial task was to 
reflect the community‘s evolving sense of justice.16 However, this 
lawmaking role was strictly limited to adjudication involving open-ended 
standards inherently thought to require a degree of judicial discretion.
17
 
Issues involving determinate rules were considered by judges to be out-of-
bounds, exclusively within the legislative mandate.
18
 
In the post-Apartheid constitutional era, this concept of limited judicial 
lawmaking and the distinction between open-ended standards and rules 
feed into the early construction of the distinction between direct and 
indirect application. Indirect application signifies that through open-ended 
standards, constitutional norms and values will permeate the common law. 
Proponents of direct application view both the common law‘s open-ended 
standards and its determinate rules as equally subject to constitutional 
scrutiny and potential striking out for invalidity.
19
 
Underlying this distinction are different understandings of the Bill of 
Rights and the way it functions. In the first view, the Bill of Rights 
represents the new boni mores in a predominately unaltered common law 
 
 
 14. See Michelman, supra note 4, at 417. 
 15. See infra note 123. 
 16. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 8. 
 17. See infra note 182. 
 18. See Tushnet, supra note 5, 85–86. 
 19. See infra note 88. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/4
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that continues to reflect changing norms and circumstances.
20
 In fact, the 
constitutional values are construed by judges as representing community 
norms and values, and the common law judicial role maintains its time-
honored function of reflecting social change incrementally. 
In opposition to this view is the disconnect often manifested between 
the empirical values of the community and constitutional values. Here, 
judges decide that their allegiance is to the new legal order, and as a result 
the common law judicial role of recognizing boni mores is altered because 
constitutional values maintain hegemony over community norms and 
sense of justice. Institutionally, substituting constitutional values for 
community norms in common law adjudication has, on occasion, allowed 
High Court judges to overrule appellate court precedent.
21
 
A related but distinct issue, also reflected in the difference between 
direct and indirect application, is the tension between a conception of the 
common law as a repository of historically accumulated humanitarian and 
libertarian wisdom and the common law as a product of Apartheid-era 
politicization and corruption. In the first approach, judges have refused to 
see a conflict between boni mores and constitutional values, but see 
constitutional values as codifications of common law freedoms.
22
 
Alternatively, in the second approach, judges view common law values to 
be in conflict with constitutional values and ultimately determine that the 
latter prevails over the former.
23
 The rhetoric here pulls in the opposite 
direction to the common law discourse of inevitability and certainty. This 
understanding of values in conflict can be seen as the beginnings of the 
politicization of common law discourse, for when there is conflict, the 
judge has to make an often politically charged choice. The more explicit 
the choice between values, the more it looks like legislative rather than 
judicial lawmaking. 
Another frequent instance of the distinction between direct and indirect 
application is the tension between incremental versus fundamental 
development of the common law. Here, indirect application becomes 
associated with the argument that the judicial role should be limited to 
common law incrementalism, while radical development accompanying 
direct application should be reserved for the legislature because issues of 
great social importance should involve the public. The distinction here 
raises the stark question of whether the court is as legitimate a lawmaker 
 
 
 20. See infra note 195. 
 21. See infra note 119. 
 22. See infra note 151. 
 23. See infra note 160. 
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as the legislature, since both are involved in the task of vindicating the 
Constitution. 
In contrast, in the jurisprudence on African customary law, an 
analogous system of law within South African legal pluralism to which the 
Constitution equally applies, the distinction between direct and indirect 
application represents different concerns than those found in common law 
reasoning.
24
 During Apartheid, many African customary law principles 
and institutions were either denied recognition or granted a secondary 
status to the common law because they were considered contrary to the 
empirical community‘s sense of morality or legal norms.25 After the 
demise of Apartheid and the advent of constitutionalism, there was an 
initial judicial reluctance to enter what was perceived to be a private 
sphere of culture, governed by its own rules and protected by its own 
checks and balances.
26
 This approach was quickly altered from non-
application to direct application of the Constitution to customary law. The 
present difficulty facing judges is identifying the content of actual, lived 
customary law. 
In one judicial approach, common law standards become associated 
with the subjection of African customary law to the common law and are 
considered a colonial vestige, causing the ossification of African 
customary law.
27
 However, the discourse surrounding application of the 
Constitution to customary law is used as a way to claim equal space for 
customary law, and to re-conceptualize African customary law and the 
common law as parallel systems, equal but separately subject to the 
Constitution. Here, the role of history, particularly the history of 
customary law‘s subjugation to common law, is pivotal in giving content 
to the distinction‘s construction. 
In cases adopting the opposite approach, direct application and the 
striking out of customary law rules are employed because the court is 
deemed to lack institutional competence to develop customary law as it 
cannot ascertain what actual, lived customary law is.
28
 A contrasting 
judicial approach acknowledges the difficulties of ascertaining actual, 
lived customary law but maintains that indirect application and the 
development of a customary law rule should always take priority over 
striking out the rule in order to preserve, rather than destroy, a system 
 
 
 24. See infra note 249. 
 25. See infra note 234. 
 26. See infra note 62.  
 27. See infra note 297. 
 28. See generally infra note 311. 
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given special recognition by the Constitution.
29
 Here, indirect application 
comes to be equated with survival of African customary law and a greater 
commitment to multiculturalism, while direct application signifies the 
limitations of liberal tolerance and judicial institutional competence. 
Equally, indirect application signifies an increased judicial role, whereas 
direct application represents the limitation of legitimate judicial reach. 
This Article will attempt to tease out how these underlying issues play 
out in the application clauses jurisprudence, since all these manifestations 
of the distinction between direct and indirect application raise fundamental 
questions about the nature of the Bill of Rights. Tension exists over the 
choice to view the Bill of Rights as a set of libertarian protections against 
potentially oppressive majoritarian rule or as a set of principles and 
commitments to guide a process of social transformation.
30
 The 
application clauses cases also raise essential institutional questions, not 
only about the crucial relationship between judicial and legislative 
lawmaking, but also more pointed questions regarding the appropriate 
relationships and degrees of deference that constitutional and common law 
adjudicators ought to follow in calibrating (1) divergent norms and values 
reflected in the pre-constitutional common law, (2) those norms found in 
constitutional text and history, and (3) those norms currently prevailing in 
South African society at large. 
Part II of this Article reviews the different academic positions on the 
application debate, which I divide into first and second generations of 
thought on these issues. Part III looks briefly at Apartheid regulation of 
marriage through the common law, and how the conception of common 
law boni mores, public policy, was the chief doctrinal vehicle by which 
Apartheid values permeated the fabric of the common law. Through 
examining the late Chief Justice Michael Corbett‘s leading law review 
article in the 1980s, I suggest that the early insistence on constitutional 
values permeating common law through the vehicle of flexible standards 
rather than rules was primarily premised upon a particular conception of 
the role of judges—namely that their policymaking function was largely 
limited to instances where they were expressly mandated to use open-
ended legal standards in adjudication; therefore, when authorized, 
policymaking was thought to inherently require judicial discretion.
31
 The 
implication here is that for reform of common law rules, the legislature 
was better suited to carry it out. 
 
 
 29. See infra note 320. 
 30. Cf. infra note 63 with infra note 59. 
 31. See infra note 114. 
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Part IV of this Article traces the issues of recognition of same-sex and 
Muslim marriages through the post-Apartheid courts and argues that the 
prevailing form of application has been indirect. Courts used the 
traditional common law vehicle of public policy to import the egalitarian 
values of the Constitution with varying implications for judicial 
articulation of the relationship between social norms and constitutional 
values. This part explores three different approaches to the construction of 
the relationship between boni mores and constitutional values and argues 
that each approach represents an increasingly constitutionalized 
understanding of common law adjudication. By this I mean that common 
law concepts, reasoning, and baselines seem to merge into and become 
indistinguishable from constitutional inquiry. The traditional common law 
judicial function of reflecting change in societal norms incrementally is 
slowly deconstructed by the judicial problematizing of the notion of a 
coherent community with homogenous values.
32
 What ultimately emerges 
is the exact opposite view. Even if the community disagrees with the 
outcome, common law judicial allegiance is not to the norms of the 
empirical community, but rather to the vindication of constitutional 
values.
33
 
This part further argues that simultaneously, each approach becomes 
increasingly constitutionalized. The form of indirect application deployed 
in cases combines elements of direct application into an indirect 
applications analysis. This culminates in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
decision in the Fourie
34
 case, which can be seen as an example of a ―one 
law‖ approach35 and stands as an example of constitutionalized common 
law. Here, it is difficult to see whether the case is one of direct or indirect 
application. Hence the distinction becomes, for all intents and purposes, 
insignificant. 
 
 
 32. See infra note 123. 
 33. See infra note 126. 
 34. Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs 2005 (3) SA 429 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 35. See Pharma. Mfrs. Assoc. of S. Afr. In re The Ex Parte Application President of the Republic 
of S. Afr. 2000 (3) BCLR 241, ¶ 44 (CC) (S. Afr.), where Justice Arthur Chaskalson stated:  
I cannot accept this contention which treats the common law as a body of law separate and 
distinct from the Constitution. These are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same 
subject matter, each having similar requirements, each operating in its own field with its own 
highest court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the 
supreme law, and all law, including common law derives its force from the Constitution and 
is subject to constitutional control. 
See also Frank I. Michelman, The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution, 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (Juta) 11-1 (2005) (teasing out the implications of the doctrine of 
legality and conception of constitutional supremacy). 
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Part V of this Article looks at African customary law and its structural 
and ideological relationship to both the Constitution and the common law. 
Initially, post-Apartheid courts showed reluctance to enter into the 
substance of African customary law and left law reform in this area to the 
legislature.
36
 This approach quickly changed in the case of Mabuza v. 
Mbatha,
37
 where a High Court developed a customary rule of marriage and 
asserted that customary rules that did not comply with the Constitution 
would be invalidated. Consequently, the discourse of non-application was 
altered, positioning customary law as equally subject to judicial scrutiny 
for constitutionality. Ultimately, in the groundbreaking Bhe case,
38
 the 
Constitutional Court used direct application to strike out the customary 
law rule of primogeniture.  
Part VI concludes that there is a new stage in common law discourse, 
evidenced in the arena of family law, where indirect application has 
subsumed direct application to the point that it makes little sense to talk 
meaningfully about the distinction—there is little direct application could 
have achieved that could not otherwise be reached by indirect application. 
By contrast, in the context of applying the Constitution to African 
customary law, common law incrementalism and indirect application are 
strikingly rejected in favor of direct application. Both within the common 
law tradition and African customary law, the moment has arrived when the 
distinction between direct and indirect application is less significant than 
is the realization that the judicial branch is taking upon itself a greater 
lawmaking role than it previously enjoyed under the system of 
parliamentary sovereignty.
39
 While the significance of this once 
controversial distinction appears to dissolve, the discourses animating each 
type of application still bear an imprint of the attitudes towards common 
law and social transformation that framed the initial debate. 
II. APPLICATION CLAUSES AND SOCIAL NORMS: THE INITIAL DEBATE 
The application clauses are among the most innovative and progressive 
provisions of the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, with 
their sanction of greater scope for the horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights and the potential consequent constitutionalization of the common 
 
 
 36. See infra note 206. 
 37. 2003 (1) All SA 706 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 38. Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 39. See infra note 250. 
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law.
40
 Section 8(2) of the Constitution provides the apparent mandate for 
direct application in its provision that the Bill of Rights ―binds a natural or 
a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right.‖41 Section 8(3) further elaborates that in order to give effect to a 
right, courts ―must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right[,] and may develop 
rules of the common law to limit the right.‖42 At the same time, Section 
39(2) authorizes indirect application, providing that ―[w]hen interpreting 
any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights.‖43 This part of the Article traces a shift in the 
application debate over the last sixteen years of South African 
constitutionalism and what are arguably two generations of thought on the 
philosophical, institutional, and technical implications of the transition. 
Karl Klare coined the expression ―transformative constitutionalism,‖ 
which has become a catchphrase to describe South African 
constitutionalism.
44
 Unlike classical liberal constitutions, the South 
African Constitution guarantees economic, social, and cultural rights, 
embraces a substantive vision of equality, and imposes affirmative duties 
on the state to promote social welfare and assist individuals in the 
exercises of their rights.
45
 Klare calls such a characterization ―post-liberal‖ 
as it seeks to guarantee maximum freedom by simply prohibiting state 
intervention in private matters and is concerned with transformation, not 
preservation, of the status quo.
46
 The clauses of the Constitution dealing 
with its application to the common law are an outstanding example of this 
transformative agenda.
47
 Yet a transformative text does not necessarily 
 
 
 40. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. 
 41. Id. s. 8(2). 
 42. Id. s. 8(3). 
 43. Id. s. 39(2). 
 44. Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. 
RTS. 146 (1998). 
 45. Id. at 153–56. 
 46. Id. at 150, 151. 
 47. Those writers who advocated in favor of a more extensive scope of application for the 
Constitution also argued in favor of a more transformative text. They maintained that limiting the 
scope of the Constitution to state action would not account for the realities of modern distribution of 
power, where it is often the exercise of private power that poses the greatest threat to fundamental 
rights. This is particularly true in the South African context where economic power remains largely in 
the hands of whites. Many feared that the Constitution would be unable to transform the social and 
economic hierarchy, and would effectively privatize Apartheid. Accordingly, they called for the Bill of 
Rights to have horizontal effect and operate between citizens. See Stuart Woolman, Application, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/4
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translate into transformative jurisprudence, especially given the judicial 
institutional scheme set in place under the interim Constitution that 
essentially created separate but parallel constitutional and common law 
jurisdictions and threatened to insulate the common law from 
constitutional interference.
48
 It quickly becomes apparent that an analysis 
of the manner in which the application clauses have functioned in post-
Apartheid common law jurisprudence raises the larger question of the 
institutional and cultural impact of the Bill of Rights on the traditional 
common law judiciary and its mode of jurisprudence. 
In the first generation of the debate, direct application of the Bill of 
Rights to private legal relations was considered by some academics to be 
the more progressive stance because it could reach areas of private 
inequity traditionally thought to be outside the reach of law.
49
 On the other 
hand, indirect application signified the influence of constitutional values 
over the interpretation of common law doctrine without overriding it.
50
 
Further, indirect application was considered more conservative because its 
construction of horizontality signified that the Constitution would limit 
itself to ensuring that legal norms comported with it, yet constitutional 
values would not have direct access to ―extra-legal‖ social spaces.51 
Provisions of the Constitution would operate in the context of private 
disputes, not as statements of subjective rights, but as values guiding the 
development of law.
52
 
This understanding was voiced in the first generation of thought by the 
authors of The Bill of Rights Handbook (―The Handbook‖), which defines 
indirect application as a set of values that must be respected whenever 
ordinary law is interpreted, developed, or applied.
53
 The Handbook states 
that with indirect application, the Bill of Rights does not override ordinary 
law or generate its own remedies.
54
 Rather, the Bill of Rights respects the 
procedural rules and remedies of ordinary law, but does require the 
 
 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (Ctr. Human Rts.) 10-1, 10–43 (1st ed. 1999). See also THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 45–80 (Johan De Waal et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001); DENNIS DAVIS, DEMOCRACY 
AND DELIBERATION 103 (1999). 
 48. Michelman, supra note 2. 
 49. See Woolman, supra note 47, at 10-2. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 10-3. 
 52. J. W. G. Van der Walt frames the question as ―whether someone can invoke the Constitution 
to terminate extra legal social practices between private individuals that are clearly irreconcilable with 
the values embodied in the Constitution.‖ J. W. G. Van der Walt, Perspectives on Horizontal 
Application: Du Plessis v. De Klerk Revisited, 12 SA PUBLIEKREG/SA PUBLIC LAW 1, 2 (1997). 
 53. THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 47, at 64. 
 54. Id. 
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operation of ordinary law to further the values of the Bill of Rights.
55
 In 
contrast, direct application indicates the types of legal disputes to which 
the Bill of Rights is directly applicable.
56
 In these cases, the Bill of Rights 
generates its own set of remedies and overrides ordinary law as well as 
any conduct inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.
57
 
The authors of The Bill of Rights Handbook comment that the 
distinction between direct and indirect application is not merely technical, 
but rather fundamental, as the purpose and effect of each differs.
58
 While 
the purpose of direct application is to uncover any inconsistency among 
law, conduct, and the Bill of Rights, the purpose of indirect application is 
to determine whether inconsistency between the law and the Bill of Rights 
can be avoided by a proper interpretation of the two.
59
 According to The 
Handbook, ―direct application rules out certain possibilities as 
constitutionally invalid (they are struck down) whereas an indirect 
application merely proposes a possible construction of the law that 
conforms with the Constitution.‖60 
Advocates of direct application criticized indirect application as 
―potentially immunizing from direct constitutional scrutiny a whole range 
of feudal and racist relationships‖ and is thus ill suited for the radical 
social transformation required of South African society.
61
 They feared that 
choices made with respect to application would reflect traditional liberal 
political theory, which requires liberty to include government non-
intervention in the private affairs of individuals.
62
 They were concerned 
 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 35. 
 57. See id. A corollary of this is that the common law courts would have final jurisdiction over a 
matter involving indirect application, whereas the Constitutional Court would have final jurisdiction 
over a matter involving direct application. But, in terms of both the interim and final Constitutions, the 
Constitutional Court makes the final decision as to whether a matter is a constitutional matter or 
whether an issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 
s. 167(3)(c); S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 s. 98(2)(f). 
 58. THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 47, at 64. 
 59. See id. at 64–67. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Dennis Davis & Stuart Woolman, The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v. De Klerk, Classical 
Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and the Application of the Fundamental Rights under the Interim and 
the Final Constitutions, 12 S. AFR. J. ON HUMAN RTS. 361, 383 (1996). See also Stuart Woolman, 
Defamation, Application, and the Interim Constitution: An Unqualified and Direct Analysis of 
Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd, 113 S. AFR. L.J. 428 (1996); J. W. G. Van der Walt, Justice 
Kriegler’s Disconcerting Judgment in Du Plessis v. De Klerk: Much Ado about Direct Horizontal 
Application (Read Nothing), 1996 J. S. AFR. L. 732, 734 (1996); Van der Walt, supra note 52. 
 62. Davis & Woolman, supra note 61, at 383. 
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that covert white interests in limiting the reach of transformation were 
behind the advocacy for indirect application.
63
 
This topic came before the Constitutional Court in Du Plessis v. De 
Klerk,
64
 the first case to consider the question of applying the interim 
Constitution to the common law.
65
 There, the majority of the 
Constitutional Court cast its vote with indirect application. Acting Justice 
Sydney Kentridge, writing on behalf of the majority, affirmed Canadian 
precedent by finding that in a constitutional democracy, it is the legislature 
and not the judiciary that has the major responsibility for law reform.
66
 He 
also wrote that the task of the judiciary is to confine itself to those 
developments necessary to keep the common law in step with society.
67
 
Methodologically, he maintained that the common law develops 
incrementally, not by being stricken.
68
 He also did not think the role of the 
Constitutional Court was to decide between competing versions of the 
common law.
69
 While rejecting the possible invalidation of common law 
rules on the basis of unconstitutionality, Kentridge endorsed a conception 
of indirect application where constitutional values permeated the common 
law in all its aspects.
70
 The implication here was that indirect application 
correlated to incremental development, whereas direct application 
signified an out-of-bounds, more radical development.
71
 
 
 
 63. See id. at 403. 
 64. 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 65. Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 66. Id. ¶ 61. 
 67. Id. (citing the Canadian case, R v. Salituro, [1992] 8 C.R.R. (2d) 173 (Can.)). 
 68. Id. ―The radical amelioration of the common law has hitherto been a function of Parliament; 
there is no reason to believe that Parliament will not continue to exercise that function.‖ Id. ¶ 53. Yet, 
this judgment, heard under the interim Constitution was very much a product of the institutional 
architecture set up under that Constitution, where there were essentially two legal systems, common 
law and constitutional, operating in tandem—each with separate jurisdictions and serving different 
functions. See Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SA 850, ¶ 57 (Kentridge, J.) (stating that if direct application were 
permitted, the Appellate Division would be deprived of a substantial part of its civil jurisdiction). 
 69. Id. ¶ 58. 
 70. Id. ¶ 62. 
 71. This debate was fleshed out in the positions of Justices Mahomed and Kriegler in Du Plessis. 
See id. ¶¶ 79, 120–135. While Mahomed favored indirect application, the implications of his reasoning 
are that there is no strict distinction between legal and social disputes, and the role of law is 
constitutive or at least legitimative of society. This view of indirect application captures within each 
reach the question of private power thought—in the first generation—only to be achieved through the 
use of direct application. Whilst Kriegler, who favored direct application, maintained a rigid 
distinction between the social and the legal—while direct application can ensure that all law complies 
with the Constitution, social and economic interactions that occur in the realm of the social are outside 
the reach of the law and direct application. In many ways, the two judgments read together illustrate 
how the meanings and consequences of direct and indirect application were cloaked in ambiguity from 
the start. This is not to say that common rules have not been examined and struck down by the 
Constitutional Court for falling short of the constitutional standard, but that it has been the rarer 
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However, the mandate to common law transformation Du Plessis put in 
place gained urgency in the 2001 case of Carmichele v. Minister of 
Safety.
72
 As if in response to an institutional reluctance of common law 
courts to fully engage with constitutionalism, the Constitutional Court 
imposed a non-discretionary obligation on common law judges to 
interrogate and transform common law rules found to be constitutionally 
wanting.
73
 Although the Court again acknowledged that it is the legislature 
and not the courts that have the major responsibility, it added that the duty 
cast upon judges in South Africa is different in degree to those of judges in 
foreign jurisdictions because the: 
interim Constitution brought into operation in one fell swoop, a 
completely new and different set of legal norms, and in these 
circumstances the courts must remain vigilant and should not 
hesitate to ensure that the common law is developed to reflect the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
74
 
The implication is that law takes the lead in the evolutionary processes 
of society, and the common law judicial role is no longer limited to 
reflecting incremental developments necessary to keep law in step with 
society. 
The judgment in Carmichele was a call for accelerated or strengthened 
indirect application, which significantly upped the ante of the Du Plessis 
majority‘s formulation of judicial function in common law adjudication.75 
The decision can be seen to signify the beginnings of a second generation 
of thought on application, where constitutional values are considered in all 
 
 
occurrence in the earliest judgments of the Court. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. 
Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (S. Afr.); Shabalala v. Attorney-General 1995 (12) 
BCLR 1593 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 72. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 73. Id. ¶ 36. 
 74. Id. ¶ 33. 
 75. The Carmichele injunction was expanded upon and extended in later cases. See, e.g., S v. 
Thebus 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) (S. Afr.) (Indirect application takes place when a rule is 
inconsistent with a constitutional provision, but also when a rule of common law falls short of its 
spirit, purport and objects.); K v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2005 (9) BCLR 835, ¶ 16 (CC) (S. Afr.) 
(The obligation imposed upon courts by s. 39(2) is extensive, requiring courts to be alert to the 
normative framework of the Constitution not only when some startling new development of the 
common law is at issue, but also in cases where the incremental development of the rule is in issue.); 
Phumelela Gaming & Leisure Ltd v. Grundling 2006 (8) BCLR 883, ¶ 26 (CC) (S. Afr.) (High Courts 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal should at all times view the interpretation of legislation as well as 
the development of common law and customary law in light of the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights.). 
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cases and the compartmentalization of common law and constitutional law 
can no longer be easily maintained.
76
 
Another view, finding its thematic expression in both first and second 
generation scholars, contended that what was important about the 
application debate was not the question of protection for the status quo, 
since it was clear from the text of the Constitution that it was a 
transformative document.
77
 This approach claimed that the important 
question was whether the legislature or the judiciary was best suited to the 
transformation of social institutions and the private sphere.
78 
In the second generation, Sprigman and Osborne argue that indirect 
application is different from direct application.
79
 In the former, a court‘s 
decision is not a constitutional ruling but a common law ruling made in 
light of constitutional values; it is both amenable to repeal, and, within its 
duty of systematic, large-scale law reform, ―unconstrained by the 
preclusive effect of the judiciary‘s ad hoc direct application of the Bill of 
Rights.‖80 
 
 
 76. Carmichele can be seen to usher in a second generation of thought on application. In this 
second generation, theorists largely agree that both direct and indirect application can yield a new 
cause of action based on the constitution; all also similarly agree that remedy operates via the common 
law, and there are no separate constitutional remedies. See, e.g., Johan van der Walt, Progressive 
Indirect Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights: Towards a Co-Operative Relation between 
Common-Law and Constitutional Jurisprudence, 17 S. AFR. J. ON HUMAN RTS. 343 (2001) (arguing 
that indirect application can found a new cause of action without reverting to using constitutional 
rights as direct causes of action, but instead by developing the common law to reflect the principles of 
the Constitution and concluding that such a bold approach renders the distinction between direct and 
indirect application is devoid of substantive significance); see also Christopher J. Roederer, Post-
matrix Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South Africa, 19 S. AFR. J. ON 
HUMAN RTS. 1, 57 (2003) (arguing there is no difference between direct and indirect application 
because pre-constitutional common law only exists by virtue of its congruence with constitutional 
values, since constitutional values are the engulfing standard and everything that is outside this matrix 
of values ceases to exist). However, see also Stuart Woolman, Application, Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (Juta) 31-1, 31-95 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that the distinction between direct and indirect 
application is still critical, particularly given the stare decisis scheme put in place in the Afrox 
judgment). 
 77. Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne, Du Plessis Is Not Dead: South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution and the Application of the Bill of Rights to Private Disputes, 15 S. AFR. J. ON HUMAN 
RTS. 25, 31 (1999). 
 78. Id. Sprigman and Osborne argue that the Court should ―decline to apply the Bill of Rights in 
the 1996 Constitution to wholly private disputes.‖ Id. at 26. In the earlier first generation debate, this 
view is expressed by Martin Brassey, Labour Relations under the New Constitution, 10 S. AFR. J. ON 
HUMAN RTS. 179 (1994). This view is also reflected in Justice Sachs‘s judgment in Du Plessis. Du 
Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850, ¶¶ 180–189 (CC) (S. Afr.) (arguing courts should refrain from 
deciding polycentric legal questions that encompass many parties or may require policy decisions that 
have complex ramifications, including the question of horizontal direct application of constitutional 
rights between private individuals). See also Michael Osborne & Chris Sprigman, Behold: Angry 
Native Becomes Postmodernist Prophet of Judicial Messiah, 118 S. AFR. L.J. 693 (2001). 
 79. Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 77. 
 80. Id. 
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However, Sprigman and Osborne take their point further than the 
narrow jurisdictional one, arguing that those who worry that anything less 
than strong horizontalism will allow privatized Apartheid to flourish 
indefinitely mistakenly assume that Parliament will be unwilling to enact 
corrective legislation.
81
 They conclude that such a lack of faith in the 
democratically elected legislature, accompanied by a high degree of 
confidence in the courts, reflects potent counter-majoritarianism.
82
 In their 
view, direct application is an instance of gratuitous counter-
majoritarianism because judicial review poses a unique threat in the 
context of a purely private dispute.
83
 The reason for this is that in vertical 
cases, individual rights are in conflict with the state, while in horizontal 
cases, individual rights are in conflict with one another. Consequently, in 
horizontal disputes the question is not whether there has been violation of 
a right—as is in a vertical dispute—but rather which party‘s rights should 
prevail. In cases of direct application, this decision is a constitutional 
ruling that strikes the balance once and for all.
84
 According to Sprigman 
and Osborne, this task of ranking rights requires a political choice that lies 
within the mandate and competency of the legislature because it can 
subject political choices to investigation, deliberation, and amendment by 
ordinary procedures.
85
 It is also these characteristics that give the 
legislative process a democratic legitimacy that can never be attained by 
judicial value selection.
86
 
From the start, the question of direct or indirect application seemed to 
correlate, in both legal doctrine and legal reasoning, with a larger theme of 
the post-Apartheid South African constitutional project as being 
committed to both continuity and change, and both stability and 
transformation.
87
 Indirect application seemed to defer to a conception of 
incremental change and wariness about creating vacuums in the common 
 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 41. 
 84. Id. at 42. 
 85. Id. at 43. 
 86.  
[T]here is a pungent irony in the fact that those who claim to be personally committed to a 
progressive social and economic agenda, at the very moment when the legislature is for the 
first time firmly in the hands of the majority of South Africans, would so energetically 
advocate a massive enlargement of judicial power. 
Id. at 51. 
 87. Given that post-Apartheid South Africa was the product of a negotiated settlement, these 
contradictory themes permeate institutional set-up and jurisprudence. See RICHARD SPITZ WITH 
MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: A HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA‘S 
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (2000). 
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law, whilst proponents of direct application seemed to advocate a more 
fundamental change in the sense that the constitution could invalidate a 
common law provision.
88
 Similarly, indirect application was limited to 
existing common law causes of action and remedies, whereas direct 
application did not appear to be limited by existing doctrines.
89
 Proponents 
of indirect application were viewed as either or both politically and 
socially conservative by those who felt that their approach left undisturbed 
all social relationships in which extant common law provided no cause of 
action.
90
 Philosophically, indirect application seemed to reflect a more 
deferential attitude towards the evolutionary reasonableness or equitability 
of the common law, whereas direct application often reflected an 
understanding of common law as political and tainted by Apartheid 
ideology.
91
 Institutionally, advocates of indirect application were 
concerned that judges not be allowed to intervene in the private sphere, 
and that transformation here was exclusively within the mandate of the 
legislature.
92
 Proponents of direct application were concerned that indirect 
application would result in the immunization of common law liberty from 
constitutional scrutiny.
93
 
III. APARTHEID CONCEPTIONS OF COMMON LAW ADJUDICATION AND 
FAMILY LAW 
Historically, according to South African common law, a marriage was 
a ―legally recognized voluntary union for life in common of one man and 
one woman, to the exclusion of all others while it lasts.‖94 The late South 
 
 
 88. Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850, ¶ 53 (CC) (S. Afr.); THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
HANDBOOK, supra note 47, at 64. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 352. 
 91. Alfred Cockrell writes that the application of the Bill of Rights to the common law will not 
necessarily require the complete rewriting of the common law, since he views the common law as a 
resourceful body of doctrine that already recognized many of the rights that are now provided. Alfred 
Cockrell, The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights, Bill of Rights Compendium (Butterworths), 
¶ 3E3.5 (1996). Compare this to Justice Cameron in Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2005 (3) SA 
429, ¶ 7 (SCA) (S. Afr.):  
More than anywhere else, apartheid enacted racism through minute elaboration in 
systematised legal regulation. As a consequence, the dogma of race infected not only our 
national life but the practice of law and our courts‘ jurisprudence at every level. 
 92. Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 77. 
 93. Supra note 47. 
 94. See H. R. HAHLO ET AL., THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 12 (1975). This 
definition was taken from the 1905 case, Ebrahim v. Essop, 1905 T.S. 59, 61 (S. Afr.). W. J. HOSTEN 
ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 612 (W. J. Hosten et al. eds., 
1983). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
474 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:457 
 
 
 
 
African writer, H. R. Hahlo, wrote that although marriage is a contract 
based on the consent of the parties, consent is not sufficient to create a 
legal marriage because the relationship it creates is not an ordinary 
contractual relationship, but involves a status of public character.
95
 
Consequently, certain marriage contracts were considered to be against 
public policy and thus void.
96
 The most significant of such marriages was 
the polygamous union, which was considered to be fundamentally 
opposed to South African principles and institutions and hence 
unenforceable.
97
 
The positivist version of this argument was that because the 
monogamous marriage of Roman Dutch law came to South Africa with 
the first Dutch settlers, it was the only form of marriage recognized by 
South African law, and ―is open to members of all population groups, 
irrespective of race, nationality or religion.‖98 However, a natural law 
conception that African customary marriages and Muslim marriages be 
refused recognition on the basis that polygamy is ―reprobated by the 
majority of civilized peoples on the ground of morality and religion‖ also 
filtered through judicial pronouncements.
99
 In the case of Ismail v. 
Ismail,
100
 the Appellate Division declared a religious Muslim marriage 
contract to be unenforceable, holding that these contracts were not contra 
bonos mores in the natural law meaning of being immoral or 
reprehensible, but in the wider, positivist implication of being contrary to 
the ―accepted customs and usages of a particular social group, that are 
usually morally binding upon all members of the group and are regarded 
as essential to its welfare and preservation.‖101 The judge added that in 
light of the growing trend in favor of equality between spouses, the 
recognition of polygamous unions might even be regarded as a retrograde 
step.
102
 
The primary policy of non-recognition was given effect in common law 
terms through the regulative concepts of boni mores or public policy.
103
 
 
 
 95. HAHLO ET AL., supra note 94, at 12. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 29. 
 99. Seedat’s Executors v. The Master (Natal) 1917 A.D. 302. 
 100. 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) (S. Afr.). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Aquilius (Mr. Justice F. P. van den Heever), Immorality and Illegality in Contract, 58 S. 
AFR. L.J. 337, 346 (1941) (―What is immoral is a factual not a legal problem.‖). ―A contract against 
public policy is one stipulating a performance which is not per se illegal or immoral but which the 
Courts, on grounds of expedience, will not enforce, because performance will detrimentally affect the 
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The conceptions of boni mores and public policy were explained in what 
is still a much cited 1987 South African Law Journal article on the role of 
policy in common law adjudication.
104
 There, the late Chief Justice 
Michael Corbett wrote about the important policymaking function that 
South African courts perform in the process of developing the common 
law and adjusting it to the ever-changing needs of society.
105
 Corbett 
questioned whether judges should embark on policymaking decisions or 
whether these matters should be left to the legislature, acting on the 
recommendations of experts.
106
 He wrote that since public policy reflects 
the mores and fundamental assumptions of the community, it is only 
natural that perceptions as to what is or is not contrary to public policy 
will vary from era to era and that ―in appropriate circumstances the courts 
may consequently introduce new categories of public policy or abandon or 
restrict old ones.‖107 
As to what would constitute such an appropriate circumstance, Corbett 
wrote that when a court is confronted with a legal problem in the common 
law for which there is no precedent or authority, then the court makes use 
of flexible standards such as public policy, boni mores, legal convictions 
 
 
interests of the community.‖ Id. In common law adjudication, the concept of public policy had a 
stylized meaning of contracts that might contribute to public injury. See also J. D. SINCLAIR ET AL., 
THE LAW OF MARRIAGE 177 (1996) (detailing the numerous dire consequences of non-recognition).  
 104. M. M. Corbett, Aspects of the Role of Policy in the Evolution of Our Common Law, 104 S. 
AFR. L.J. 52 (1987). For example, see Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995, ¶ 43 (stating that the 
proportionality exercise described by Corbett now takes place within the context of the ―spirit, purport 
and objects‖ of the Bill of Rights). 
 105. Corbett, supra note 104. Corbett discussed Minister van Polisie v. Ewels, 1975 (3) SA 590 
(A) (S. Afr.): 
Even in 1975 there were probably still two choices open to the court in the Ewels case. The 
one was to confine liability for an omission to certain stereotypes, possibly adding to them 
from time to time; the other was to adopt a wider, more open-ended general principle, which, 
while comprehending existing grounds of liability, would lay the foundation for a more 
flexible and all-embracing approach to the question whether a person‘s omission to act should 
be held unlawful or not. The court made the latter choice; and, of course, in so doing cast the 
courts for a general policymaking role in this area of the law. 
Id. at 56. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 64. As an example of this policymaking function, Corbett cites a case from 1907 where 
Chief Justice De Villiers held in the case of King v. Gray, 1907 24 S.C. 554 (S. Afr.), a marriage 
brokerage contract was contrary to public policy and unenforceable. Id. at 64. ―Nearly 80 years later a 
two-judge court of the Transvaal Provincial Division, observing that ‗the norms of conduct required by 
society do not remain static . . . , [but] may change from one generation to the next‘, upheld the 
validity of a marriage brokerage contract.‖ Id. at 64–65 (citation omitted). It is quite telling that it took 
eighty years for the court to register a change in boni mores, and reflects a less malleable judicial 
stance than that represented by Corbett. 
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of the community, or reasonableness.
108
 In explaining how courts give 
meaning to these concepts, he wrote: 
[T]he policy decisions of our courts which shape, and at times 
refashion the common law must also reflect the wishes, often 
unspoken, and the perceptions, often but dimly discerned, of the 
people. A community has certain common values and norms. . . . In 
the last resort the judge will often be required to perform a 
balancing act between two competing values, each in itself a worthy 
or desirable one. . . . And the balance which is eventually struck 
must accord with society‘s notions of what justice demands.‖109 
 On this account, the judicial function in common law cases, prior to 
the advent of constitutionalism and judicial review, is not political in the 
sense that it involved choice. Rather the judge is seen as reflecting, and 
therefore ―discovering,‖ society‘s sense of justice.110 In this sense, judicial 
lawmaking or policymaking is legitimate, because judges would not invent 
the boni mores, but rather their decisions would reflect a slowly changing 
society‘s sense of justice back to itself. 
Corbett‘s article was especially significant when viewed against the 
backdrop of the South African system of parliamentary sovereignty and 
the common understanding of the judicial role as limited to declaring 
rather than making the law.
111
 It amounted to an important 
acknowledgement by the judiciary of its own policy-making or lawmaking 
function.
112
 Yet, his article also revealed that he perceived policy-based 
decision-making to be an exceptional circumstance, occurring only where 
there is no precedent and judges adjudicate based on ―society‘s notions of 
what justice demands.‖113 There is doubtlessly a certain disconnect 
between the explicit Apartheid ideology incorporated into case law 
through the conception of boni mores and Corbett‘s conception that 
acknowledged only a very limited lawmaking role for the judge and 
 
 
 108. Id. at 67. 
 109. Id.  
 110. See HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 120. 
 111. See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 366 (1978). 
The role of the South African common law judge was to declare, rather than make, law and was 
considered to be in marked contrast to the political or policy-driven role of judges of the United States 
Supreme Court. ―[C]ourts appear to have adopted the distinction between the legislative function 
inherent in the common theory of law and regard it as their duty to analyze and interpret the will of 
parliament, but not to reason why.‖ Id. at 373. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 68. 
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confined this role to the boundary of the common law‘s flexible 
standards.
114 
It seems likely that Corbett‘s conception is reflected in early 
constitutional cases, which determined that it was through flexible 
standards that the Constitution would primarily permeate the common 
law.
115
 It is arguable that the reason for this distinction between rules and 
standards, is that standards inherently require a degree of discretion and 
lawmaking, and consequently are the natural preserve of the judiciary, 
whereas rules are considered entirely different and will be reluctantly 
changed only by the highest common law authority. This distinction is 
similar to distinctions between rules and values drawn in recent Supreme 
Court of Appeal cases, which declare that while values can animate rules, 
they are not self-standing, and a High Court judge has no discretion in 
applying the governing rule.
116
 This distinction also reminds us that 
 
 
 114. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 94, at 512 (citing Universal City Studios Inc. v. Network Video 
(Pty) Ltd. 1986 (2) SA 734 (A), ¶ 41 (―It is probably true that . . . the court does not have an inherent 
power to create substantive law . . . .‖) (Corbett, J.)).  
 115. This conception can be seen in many early proponents of indirect application, such as Justice 
Ackermann‘s view in Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SA 850, ¶ 110 (CC) (S. Afr.): 
[T]he indirect radiating effect of the Chapter 3 rights on the post-constitutional development 
in the common law and statute law of concepts such as public policy, the boni mores, 
unlawfulness, reasonableness, fairness and the like, without any of the unsatisfactory 
consequences that direct application must inevitably cause.  
See id. ¶ 53 (Kentridge, AJ.) (―The radical amelioration of the common law has hitherto been a 
function of Parliament; there is no reason to believe that Parliament will not continue to exercise that 
function.‖). This is not to say that common rules have not been interrogated and struck down by the 
Constitutional Court for falling short of the constitutional standard, but that it has been the rarer 
occurrence. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 
1517 (CC) (S. Afr.); Shabalala v. Attorney-General 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 116. See Brisley v. Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Afrox Healthcare v. Strydom 2002 (6) 
SA 21 (SCA) (S. Afr.). During Apartheid, the Appellate Division was the highest court of appeal and 
heard appeals from provincial divisions of the Supreme Court. Under the interim Constitution, the 
court hierarchical structure was preserved, save the creation of an additional Constitutional Court as 
the court of final instance over constitutional matters. In terms of the interim Constitution, the 
Appellate Division had no constitutional jurisdiction and was the highest common law court of appeal, 
whilst the Constitutional Court was confined to constitutional matters and had no jurisdiction to 
develop the common law. Under the 1996 Constitution, the Appellate Division has been renamed the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and still is the highest court of appeal with respect to the common law, 
although now it has constitutional jurisdiction. Similarly, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to 
develop the common law. The Constitutional Court can function as a court of first instance as well as a 
court of appeal, and must confirm certain orders of invalidity made by other courts. S. AFR. (Interim) 
CONST. 1993 ss. 86–98; S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 165–174. See THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL & 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 267–314 (Iain Currie & Johan de Waal eds., 2001). There have been recent, 
highly contentious legislative proposals to merge the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court into one apex court. See Carole Lewis, Reaching the Pinnacle: Principle, Policies and People 
for a Single Apex Court in South Africa, 21 S. AFR. J. ON HUMAN RTS. 509 (2005). For a related 
analysis of the doctrine of constitutional legality as both an enforceable rule and an interpretive value, 
see Michelman, supra note 2. 
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historically, the amelioration of the blunt force of rules was considered to 
be reserved for the legislature alone.
117
 
IV. POST-APARTHEID INDIRECT APPLICATION AND BONI MORES: A LOOK 
AT SAME-SEX AND MUSLIM MARRIAGE 
The question then is how post-Apartheid common law courts came to 
negotiate the interaction between rules, boni mores, and constitutional 
values. In doctrinal areas, such as contract law, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal—the highest court of appeal in non-constitutional matters—
interpreted constitutional values to be fully consonant with the hegemony 
of common law liberty and freedom of contract.
118
 Institutionally, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was concerned with circumscribing the ability 
of lower courts to overrule precedent under the guise of giving effect to 
the ―spirit, purports and objects‖ of the Constitution.119 
However, in the area of family law,
120
 specifically marital recognition, 
there is a proliferation of ways in which the Bill of Rights has influenced 
common law doctrine and discourse. This raises a different institutional 
question regarding the relationship between judicial and legislative 
lawmaking. Perhaps it was inevitable that the fractured terrain of South 
African family law would be the site of such proliferation given its glaring 
hierarchical nature.
121
 Many common law provisions regulating family law 
 
 
 117. See H. R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS 
BACKGROUND 583 (1968) (―[T]he common law gives the judge no discretion . . . amelioration of the 
rule if considered desirable, must be produced by the legislature.‖). See also Bank of Lisbon & S. Afr. 
Ltd. v. Ornelas 1988 (2) All SA 393 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (finding that there is no general equitable 
jurisdiction that could override a clear rule of law). See also Carole Lewis, The Demise of the Exceptio 
Doli: Is There Another Route to Contractual Equity?, 107 S. AFR. L.J. 26 (1990); Jonathan Lewis, 
Fairness in South African Contract Law, 120 S. AFR. L.J. 330 (2003); Crown City Restaurant CC v. 
Gold Reef City Theme Park (Pty) Ltd. 2007 (5) BCLR 453 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 118. See Brisley v. Drotskey, 2002 (4) SA 1; Afrox Healthcare v. Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21. But see 
Barkhuizen v. Napier 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) (S. Afr.) (reworking that paradigm). 
 119. See Afrox Healthcare, 2002 (6) SA 21. See also Stuart Woolman & Danie Brand, Is There a 
Constitution in This Courtroom? Constitutional Jurisdiction after Afrox and Walters, 18 SA 
PUBLIEKREG/SA PUBLIC LAW 37, 43–44 (2003) (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis and the 
relationship between the High Courts and Supreme Court of Appeal). 
 120. See, e.g., Jooste v. Botha 2000 (2) BCLR 187 (T) (S. Afr.) (cause of action compelling a 
famous father to provide loving care to an out of wedlock son on the basis of s. 28 in the 1996 
Constitution); Robinson v. Volks NO 2004 (6) SA 288 (HC, Cape Provincial Div.) (S. Afr.) 
(application of Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act to a heterosexual life-partnership); Petersen v. 
Maintenance Officer 2004 (1) All SA 117 (HC, Western Cape) (S. Afr.) (duty of grandparents to 
support child born out of marriage); Bezuidenhout v. Bezuidenhout 2003 (6) SA 691 (HC, Cape 
Provincial Div.) (S. Afr.) (asset redistribution upon divorce); Van Rooyen v. Van Rooyen 2001 (2) All 
SA 37 (T) (S. Afr.) (lesbian mother‘s right of access); S v. Ferreira 2004 (4) All SA 373 (SCA) 
(concerning abused married women who kill their spouses). 
 121. During Apartheid, only civil marriages were given full legal recognition, while African 
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were explicitly coercive and often innocuous, likely to be considered by 
most as an uncontroversial example of a doctrinal area that was 
illegitimately invaded by Apartheid policies.
122
 
This Part will analyze the common law jurisprudence on Muslim 
marriage and same-sex marriage in order to understand how the 
application debate impacts traditional common law analysis. Underlying 
these judgments is an evolving conception of the relationship among 
judicial and legislative lawmakers. First I will look at those cases where 
traditional indirect application has been the norm and courts have used the 
common law vehicle of public policy to import the values of the 
Constitution into the common law. Here, I will argue that the impact of 
constitutional values on common law discourse is two-fold: first, it relaxes 
the institutional and cultural bias against explicit judicial lawmaking; 
second, it allows the judiciary to see, and therefore be able to respond to, 
an empirically changed and continually changing society. A variation of 
this theme is that constitutional values themselves are seen to be a 
reflection of changed social norms, and therefore—within the unaltered 
ambit of traditional common law—judicial function, which sees the 
common law judge as reflecting society back to itself. This approach 
views the post-Apartheid common law judicial role as continuous with the 
pre-constitutional task of responding incrementally to social change. In 
this role, the judge clearly does not see himself or herself as involved in 
political work requiring hard choices, but rather as confined to elucidating 
the evolving common law.
123
 
In a second approach that emerges, constitutional values dominate the 
conflict between social norms and constitutional values. Constitutional 
values appear in this version as not deriving from the empirical 
community‘s boni mores, but as altering the boni mores.124 This approach 
is increasingly politicized in that it acknowledges a clash of values, which 
 
 
marriages were governed under a separate regulatory regime and granted mere limited recognition as 
―unions‖ rather than marriages. See T. W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 190 (2004). 
 122. During Apartheid, there was a longstanding debate about the extent to which Apartheid 
policy and principle invaded and therefore tainted the common law. See John Dugard, Should Judges 
Resign?—A Reply to Professor Wacks, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 286 (1984); Cora Hoexter, Judicial Policy in 
South Africa, 103 S. AFR. L.J. 436 (1986); Edwin Cameron, Legal Chauvinism, Executive-Mindedness 
and Justice—L C Steyn’s Impact on South African Law, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 38 (1982); Raymond Wacks, 
Judges and Injustice, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 266 (1984); Raymond Wacks, Judging Judges: A Brief 
Rejoinder to Professor Dugard, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 295 (1984). It is arguable that while contract law is 
the harder case, and theorists disagree about the extent to which Apartheid principles had permeated 
the common law of contract, the area of family law is an ―easier case‖ for being more obviously 
invaded by Apartheid principles and in need of reconstruction. 
 123. Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) (S. Afr.).  
 124. Ryland v. Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) (S. Afr.).  
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involves choice.
125
 However, the judge refuses this potential politicization 
of the judicial role by asserting a non-discretionary allegiance to 
uncontested constitutional values.
126
 
In a third approach, found in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in 
Fourie,
127
 Judge Cameron, working outside the paradigm of flexible 
standards and in the terrain of legal rules, acknowledged that constitutional 
values conflict, and the judicial role involves choice.
128
 On this approach, 
common law constitutional analysis is a form of politics necessitating 
choice, thus rendering the distinction between legislative and judicial 
lawmaking increasingly fragile.
129
 
In each of these approaches, there is a progressive move away from the 
purist paradigm of indirect application, and legal analysis increasingly 
takes on characteristics of direct application. Given Fourie‘s end result, it 
is difficult to tell precisely whether it was a case of direct application or 
indirect application. This leads to the conclusion that the distinction 
between direct and indirect application, about which people had once felt 
extremely passionate, has come to be less significant.
130
 
A. Evolutionary Common Law Adjudication 
The cases of Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund
131
 and 
Du Plessis v. Road Accident Fund
132
 dealt with the recognition of Muslim 
marriages and same-sex unions, respectively. In Amod, the appellant was a 
widow who had been married to the deceased according to Islamic rites.
133
 
She instituted an action against the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident 
Fund claiming damages suffered as a result of the death of her husband in 
a motor vehicle accident prior to the enactment of either the interim or 
final Constitution.
134
 
 
 
 125. Id. at 705, ¶ C (―[I]f the spirit, purport and objects of chap 3 of the Constitution and the basic 
values underlying it are in conflict with the view as to public policy . . . then the values underlying 
chap 3 of the Constitution must prevail.‖). 
 126. Id.  
 127. Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs 2005 (3) SA 429 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 128. Id. ¶ 5. 
 129. Id. ¶ 22. 
 130. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1349 (1982). 
 131. 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 132. 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 133. Id. ¶ 1. 
 134. The Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident fund was set up to pay compensation to people 
injured or killed in road accidents through the negligent driving of motor vehicles. It was succeeded by 
the Road Accident Fund (―RAF‖). Road Accident Fund (formerly Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
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After some preliminary skirmishes, the case arrived before the late 
Chief Justice Ismail Mahomed. He considered the historical origins of 
dependants‘ action in common law and emphasized that equity requires 
that a dependant be able to recover from a party who has unlawfully and 
wrongfully caused the death of a breadwinner.
135
 In order to succeed in her 
claim, the appellant would have to prove that her right to such support was 
worthy of protection by law, which would be assessed according to the 
prevailing boni mores of society.
136
 Although the case concerned a 
statutory claim, the respondents argued that the appellant‘s claim should 
fail because while the relevant system of customary law by which she was 
married permitted polygamy, her marriage was invalid at common law, 
and her claim unenforceable.
137
 
Chief Justice Mahomed approached the inquiry by focusing not on the 
question of whether the marriage was lawful at common law, but whether 
the deceased had the legal duty to support the appellant during the 
marriage.
138
 If this was the case, then the deciding question was whether 
the widow deserved protection in these circumstances.
139
  
In answering the question, an important consideration was the fact that 
the new ethos of religious freedom was well established at the time the 
cause of action arose, which was prior to the enactment of the interim 
Constitution.
140
 The Court emphasized that as the present marriage was 
always a monogamous one, there was no meaningful distinction between 
this marriage and a Christian one.
141
 Chief Justice Mahomed explained 
that this new ethos was substantially different from one that informed the 
boni mores of the community, which held that ―potentially polygamous‖ 
marriages did not deserve the protection of the law for the purposes of the 
dependant‘s action.142 He wrote: 
I have no doubt that the boni mores of the community at the time 
when the cause of action arose in the present proceedings would not 
 
 
Accidents Fund), http://www.capegateway.gov.za/eng/pubs/public_info/G/47578/5 (last visited June 
21, 2010). 
 135. Amod, 1999 (4) SA 1319. 
 136. Id. The significant elements discussed are: (a) the deceased had a duty to support her, and (b) 
the duty was legally enforceable. Id. ¶ 12. 
 137. Id. The respondents argued that the dependant‘s action for loss of support was an anomalous 
remedy that should not accommodate claims for loss of support undertaken contractually, which do not 
flow from the common law consequences of a valid marriage. Id. ¶ 16. 
 138. Id. ¶ 19. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. ¶ 20. 
 141. Id. ¶ 23. 
 142. Id. ¶ 21. 
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support a conclusion which denies to a duty of support arising from 
a de facto monogamous marriage solemnly entered into in accord 
with the Muslim faith any recognition in the common law for the 
purposes of the dependant‘s action; but which affords to the same 
duty of support arising from a similarly solemnized marriage in 
accord with the Christian faith full recognition in the same common 
law for the same purpose; and which even affords to polygamous 
marriages solemnized in accordance with the Christian faith full 
recognition in the same common law for the same purpose; and 
which even affords to polygamous marriages solemnized in 
accordance with African customary law exactly the same protection 
for the same purpose . . . .
143
 
 Chief Justice Mahomed‘s analysis made use of internal common law 
reasoning, which he characterized as essentially equitable and continually 
evolving to reflect the changing social norms.
144
 He viewed the 
dependant‘s action as a particularly adaptable creature, and claimed that 
on proper analysis of existing relevant common law rules, ―a claim of loss 
of support made on behalf of a Muslim widow in the position of the 
appellant is sound in law.‖145 He based this departure from precedent on 
the evolving nature of the community‘s values and norms in existence 
prior to the enactment of the Constitution.
146
 
In keeping with the jurisprudence of functional incrementalism, Chief 
Justice Mahomed stated that he only recognizes de facto monogamous 
Muslim marriages, and only for the purposes of the dependant‘s action.147 
However, given that the cause of action and change to the empirical boni 
mores that Chief Justice Mahomed based his decision upon took place 
prior to the enactment of the Constitution, Amod can be seen as a case of 
non-application of the Bill of Rights.
148
 
 
 
 143. Id. ¶ 23. 
This important shift in the identifiable boni mores of the community must also manifest itself 
in a corresponding evolution in the relevant parameters of application in this area. ―The 
common law is not to be trapped within the limitations of its past.‖ If it does not do this it 
would risk losing the virility, relevance and creativity which it needs to retain its legitimacy 
and effectiveness in the resolution of conflict between and in the pursuit of justice among the 
citizens of a democratic society. For this reason the common law constantly evolves to 
accommodate changing values and new needs. 
Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. ¶¶ 5, 23–24. 
 146. See id. ¶¶ 23–24. 
 147. See id. ¶ 24. 
 148. Another example of this approach, where the constitution serves as the impetus to ―see‖ 
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Du Plessis v. Road Accident Fund mirrors the facts in Amod, except 
that the relationship in question was a same-sex partnership.
149
 As the 
cause of action took place after the enactment of the Constitution, the 
court used section 39(2) of the Constitution to extend the action for loss of 
support to partners in same-sex permanent life relationships similar to 
marriage in other respects, and who had a contractual duty to support each 
other.
150
 Doing this, it was said, took ―an incremental step to ensuring that 
the common law accorded with the dynamic and evolving fabric of society 
as reflected in the Constitution.‖151 
In this judgment, constitutional values did the work, but did so through 
the common law doctrine of boni mores, which facilitated the expansion 
of common law to recognize a greater variety of dependent relationships. 
The judge expressly stated that ―the incidence and extent of duties are 
liable to adjustment in the light of the constant shifts and changes in 
community attitudes,‖152 and that the constitutional values themselves 
represent boni mores, community norms and attitudes.
153
 Hence, this 
judicial development was in keeping with the time honored role of the 
judiciary in responding to changes in society since the source of 
constitutional values is in society. It was essential to this judgment that the 
 
 
changes that have occurred ―out there‖ in real life and the adjudicator sees him or herself as reflecting 
such changes, is Langemaat v. Minister of Safety and Security, 1998 (3) SA 312 (T) (S. Afr.), where 
the applicant, a member of the South African Police Services and a lesbian in a relationship for twelve 
years, sought to have her partner listed as a dependant on her medical aid scheme. Deciding in her 
favor, Judge Pierre Roux stated: 
I would ignore my experience and knowledge of several same-sex couples who have lived 
together for years. The stability and permanence of their relationships is no different from the 
many married couples I know. Both types of union are deserving of respect and protection. If 
our law does not accord protection to the type of union I am dealing with then I suggest it is 
time it does so. This is how I understand what section 39(2) of the Constitution has in mind. 
Id. at 316, ¶ G.  
 149. 2003 (1) SA 359 (SCA) (S. Afr.). In the court below, Judge De Klerk rejected the argument 
that the common law duty of support be extended to include same sex partners. 2002 (4) SA 596 (T) 
(S. Afr.) He commented that should the duty of support be recognized, it would open a can of worms 
since it would not only lead to many tenuous claims, but it would also establish a duty of support in all 
similar homosexual relationships where both parties are still alive. Id. at 498, ¶ E. It would, for 
instance, mean that on the dissolution of a homosexual relationship, a partner to such relationship 
would have a right to claim maintenance from the other. The court also stated that the monogamous 
heterosexual common-law marriage is the only form of marriage recognized in our law. Id. at 599, ¶ C. 
 150. Du Plessis, 2003 (1) SA 359, ¶¶ 36–37. 
 151. Id. ¶ 37. The court stressed: 
It is important to emphasize that the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff fell short of 
requesting this court to extend the common law definition of marriage, which requires that the 
union be between man and woman, to persons of the same sex. 
Id. ¶ 7. 
 152. Id. ¶ 17. 
 153. Id. ¶ 18. 
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evolution be seen as incremental; the judge stressed that he had not been 
asked to grant a more generalized recognition to same-sex relationships.
154
 
The implication is that a more generalized recognition of same-sex 
relationships would overstep the institutional limits of incremental 
development and legitimate judicial role. 
B. Transformative Common Law Adjudication 
A second approach to the relationship between boni mores and 
constitutional values can be seen in Ryland v. Edros,
155
 where the judge 
characterized the relationship between boni mores and constitutional 
values as one of conflict.
156
 Ryland was an earlier case that emerged from 
the post-Apartheid High Court and concerned the question of whether the 
Ismail precedent precluded enforcement of the proprietary terms of an 
Islamic marriage contract because the marriage was potentially 
polygamous and contrary to public policy.
157
 
Justice Ian Farlam wrote that, while it was true that public policy is 
essentially a question of fact, it would be difficult to find that there was 
such a change in the community‘s general sense of justice as to justify a 
refusal to follow the Ismail precedent had it not been for the new 
Constitution.
158
 Accordingly, he preferred to base the decision on the 
fundamental alteration in the basic values of the legal order brought about 
by the new Constitution.
159
 If the spirit, purport, and objects of chapter 
three of the Constitution and the basic values underlying it were in conflict 
with the public policy expressed and applied in precedent, then the values 
underlying the Constitution must dominate.
160
 He framed the question as 
whether constitutional values are in conflict with public policy expressed 
in Ismail and stated,  
[I]t is inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one 
group to impose its values on another and that the Courts should 
only brand a contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive 
 
 
 154. See id. ¶ 37. See also id. ¶ 43. 
 155. 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) (S. Afr.). 
 156. Id. at 705, ¶ C.  
 157. See Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) (S. Afr.). 
 158. Ryland, 1997 (2) SA 690, at 704, ¶ D. (―What is immoral is a factual not a legal problem.‖) 
(citing Mr. Justice F. P. van den Heever, Immorality and Illegality in Contracts, 58 S. AFR. L.J. 337, 
346 (1941)). In terms of the Ismail precedent, the marriage contracts in question were both contrary to 
public policy (defined as contacts which might redound to public injury) and contra bonos mores. Id. 
at 709, ¶ C. 
 159. Id. at 704, ¶ D. 
 160. Ryland, 1997 (2) SA 690(C) at 705, ¶ C. 
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to those values which are shared by the community at large, . . . not 
only by one section of it.
161
  
However, the Ismail precedent accounted for the views of only one group 
in a plural society.
162
 
Justice Farlam went on to find that principles of equality underlie the 
Constitution and ―irradiate‖ concepts of public policy and boni mores.163 
The effect of these values is that both the contra bonos mores and the 
grounds for refusing to enforce the consequences of an Islamic marriage 
could no longer stand. Farlam stressed that this was a case of potential, not 
actual, polygamy, and that the court was not being asked to recognize a 
polygamous marriage, but to enforce certain terms of a contract made 
between parties that are collateral to the marriage.
164
 
In Farlam‘s opinion, he contrasted public policy and the community‘s 
sense of justice with constitutional values and found that a conflict existed 
between the constitutional values and the boni mores present in society as 
previously articulated in judicial precedent.
165
 Where there is such conflict, 
constitutional values trump.
166
 
Technically, whilst employing the traditional entry point of a flexible 
standard, Justice Farlam‘s approach differs from that stipulated in The Bill 
of Rights Handbook
167
 to indirect application. Instead of interpreting the 
boni mores to be congruous with constitutional values, as prescribed by 
The Handbook, Farlam treated the boni mores as empirical facts that can 
conflict with constitutional requirements and put forward the notion that 
judges are required to enforce constitutional values.
168
 At the same time, 
he stated that the conception of the empirical norms of the community 
upheld in Ismail were unconstitutional because the boni mores were those 
of a small group rather then society as a whole.
169
 However, he did not go 
on to find that the more representative boni mores would favor 
enforcement, but ―prefer[red] to base [his] decision on the fundamental 
alteration in regard to the basic values on which our civil polity is 
based.‖170 In effect, he was ―striking down‖ or invalidating the conception 
 
 
 161. Id. at 707, ¶ G.  
 162. Id. at 707, ¶ H. 
 163. Id. at 709, ¶ A (using the expression of the German Federal Constitutional Court). 
 164. Id. at 709, ¶ D.  
 165. Id. at 704, ¶ C. 
 166. Id. at 705, ¶ C. 
 167. See THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 47, at 64–67. 
 168. See id. at 64–67.  
 169. Ryland, 1997 (2) SA 690 (C), at 707, ¶ H. 
 170. Id. at 704, ¶ D. 
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of community norms announced in Ismail, and positing constitutional 
values in its stead.
171
 In this respect, his analysis, although indirect, 
resembles direct application. Accordingly, the distinction between direct 
and indirect application loses some of its all-or-nothing quality.
172
 
In both approaches described above, judges operate incrementally 
within the flexible standards of the common law. Whilst the first set of 
cases is in keeping with the traditional judicial mandate of keeping the 
boni mores contemporaneous, Ryland views the Constitution as 
representing values that legally outrank the community‘s norms or sense 
of justice.
173
 This is a distinct shift in judicial function, since the role of the 
common law judge is to give voice to constitutional values as opposed to 
community norms. Institutionally, this shift allowed Farlam, a High Court 
judge, to overrule precedent from the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Ismail.
174
 But he was cautious not to push the boundary between 
legislative and judicial lawmaking, and did not grant outright recognition 
to Muslim marriages. He expressly stipulated that he was not dealing with 
a situation involving actual polygamous spouses.
175
 
C. Constitutionalized Common Law and Fourie 
Fourie
176
 broke ground as it dealt with the constitutionality of the 
common law rule defining marriage as exclusively between a man and a 
woman. From the outset, this case was concerned with a rule or omission, 
rather than the open-ended policy thought to be the preferred channel for 
indirect analysis.
177
 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, Justice Cameron found that 
the common law definition of marriage denied a host of benefits, 
protections, and duties to gays and lesbians wishing to solemnize their 
union.
178
 He also emphasized the ―deeper‖ harm of exclusion, which 
signified to gay and lesbian people that their relationships were inferior 
and they could never ―be fully part of the community of moral equals that 
 
 
 171. Id. at 705, ¶ C. 
 172. See Kennedy, supra note 130, at 1351 (―The development of intermediate terms means 
formal recognition that some situations are neither one thing nor another . . . but rather share some 
characteristics of each pole . . . .‖). 
 173. Ryland, 1997 (2) SA 690 (C), at 705, ¶ C. 
 174. Id. at 711, ¶ C. 
 175. Id. at 709, ¶ D. 
 176. Fourie, 2005 (3) SA 429 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 177. See id. ¶ 5. 
 178. Id. ¶ 16. 
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the Constitution promises to create for all.‖179 In his view, this exclusion 
―undermines the values which underlie an open and democratic society,‖ 
and in the absence of justification, it constitutes unfair discrimination in 
terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution.
180
 
In his analysis, Justice Cameron looked at possible justifications for the 
exclusion, including that the majority of South Africans still think of 
marriage as a heterosexual institution and view an extension to gays and 
lesbians unfavorably.
181
 He wrote: 
Our task is to develop the common law in accordance with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. In this our sole duty 
lies to the Constitution: but those we engage with most deeply in 
explaining what that duty entails is the nation, whose understanding 
of and commitment to constitutional values is essential if the larger 
project of securing justice and equality under law for all is to 
succeed. 
 In interpreting and applying the Constitution we therefore move 
with care and respect, and with appreciation that a diverse and 
plural society is diverse and plural precisely because not everyone 
agrees on what the Constitution entails. Respect for difference 
requires respect also for divergent views about constitutional values 
and outcomes.
182
 
 Justice Cameron concluded that the appellants were ―entitled . . . to a 
declaration that their intended marriage is capable of recognition as 
lawfully valid subject to compliance with statutory formalities.‖183 He 
stressed that once the court decides that the Bill of Rights requires the 
common law to be developed, it does not intrude upon the legislative 
process because ―[i]t is precisely this role that the Bill of Rights envisages 
must be fulfilled, and which it entrusts to the judiciary.‖184 
Justice Farlam authored the dissenting judgment, where he approached 
the question institutionally and asked whether such a development 
constituted an incremental change mandated by indirect application, or 
 
 
 179. Id. ¶ 15. 
 180. Id. ¶ 16. Section 9(3) of the Constitution provides: ―The state may not unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, language and birth.‖ 
 181. Fourie, 2005 (3) SA 429, ¶ 20. 
 182. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. 
 183. Id. ¶ 48. 
 184. Id. ¶ 40. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
488 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:457 
 
 
 
 
whether it involved a fundamental change, which would preferably be 
undertaken by Parliament.
185
 Farlam was concerned that such an extension 
would not be an incremental step, but ―a quantum leap across a chasm,‖ 
the consequences of which would be a ―crisis of the reality of law‖ where 
what the population practiced was the opposite of that contained in the law 
books.
186
 After traversing the long secular history of marriage, Farlam 
found that the common law definition of marriage violated equality and 
dignity and could not be justified.
187 
In
 
other words, he utilized indirect 
application. He concluded that the extension of the common law definition 
of marriage to same-sex couples could not involve a fundamental change 
in the traditional concept of marriage and decided to develop the common 
law, but then suspend development so that Parliament had the opportunity 
to intervene. 
From the start, the case is distinguishable from the previous cases 
discussed in that it is not a policy or flexible rule that is being adjudicated, 
but rather a categorical omission created by the exclusive definition of 
marriage.
188
 Cameron‘s judgment appears to take the Ryland version of 
incrementalism a step further and arguably represents an instance of the 
Constitutional Court injunction to ―one law.‖189 From the start, the 
discourse follows a more constitutional than common law analysis in its 
refusal to embark on tedious review of case law to ―prove‖ 
incrementalism.
190
  
Justice Farlam‘s approach is more traditionally common law-like as it 
focuses on the internal development of doctrine, such that incrementalism 
appears to require recognition. He clearly stated at the outset that his 
analysis is a section 39(2) indirect application analysis, while Cameron‘s 
approach is difficult to pin down and appears to combine a section 8(3) 
mandate for direct application with a section 39(2) indirect application 
injunction.
191
 Farlam wrote of the sections ―taken together‖ as constituting 
an ―imperative normative setting that obliges courts develop the common 
 
 
 185. Id. ¶ 67. 
 186. Id. ¶ 107. 
 187. Id. ¶ 100. See also id. ¶ 101 (Farlam, J.) (citing Carmichele as authority for indirect 
application); id. ¶ 111 (Farlam, J.) (again expressing concern with incrementalism). 
 188. See, e.g., id. ¶ 15. 
 189. See Pharma. Mfrs. Assoc. of S. Afr., In re The Ex Parte Application President of the Republic 
of S. Afr. 2000 (3) BCLR 241, ¶ 37 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 190. Fourie, 2005 (3) SA 429, ¶ 5.  
 191. Id. ¶ 15. For example, Justice Farlam refers to Carmichele, the authority for indirect 
application, while there is no analogous reference to Khumalo, the authority for direct horizontal 
application judgment. Id. ¶¶ 22–25. 
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law.‖192 In terms of substance and remedy, both clearly operate in the new 
arena of constitutionalized common law. While Farlam goes to great 
lengths to demonstrate that his judgment is a natural and therefore 
reasonable extension of previous common law judgments that is 
comfortably positioned within the legitimate jurisdiction of the 
judiciary,
193
 Cameron seems to address the broader questions of 
constitutional values, social norms, and political choice. He argues that the 
nature or extent of the changes to be brought about is not less significant 
than common law development within the competency of the judiciary.
194
 
While Farlam‘s rhetoric pulled towards indirect application and 
affirmation of the common law, Cameron‗s judgment spoke in the 
language of direct horizontal application and constitutional hegemony. 
Justice Cameron addressed the question of community norms when 
dealing with possible justifications for the rule. In contrast to previous 
approaches, he refused to sidestep this question and found that 
constitutional values represent the new boni mores—arguably he could not 
find otherwise, given the assertions that a majority of South Africans 
viewed the extension of marriage to gays and lesbians unfavorably—195 
but acknowledged that the values embodied in the Constitution are there 
by the dint of the founders‘ choices.196 While asserting the supremacy of 
the Constitution, he refused to end the debate by simply determining that 
constitutional values are absolutely conclusive. Rather, he determined that 
if the constitutional project is to succeed, it is imperative that the nation 
understand and be committed to constitutional values.
197
 This view is a 
world away from Corbett‘s conception that the judge reflects and 
―discovers‖ the community‘s sense of justice.198 In Cameron‘s view, the 
judge must exercise choice and must then explain or justify that choice to 
the community or the nation.
199
 Even when the nation is committed to the 
constitutional project, there is an acknowledgement that values may 
conflict and contradict each other, and not everyone agrees on 
outcomes.
200
 
 
 
 192. Id. ¶ 5 (moving the application discussion away from discrete sections composed of direct 
and indirect, and preferring discussion of the normative obligation flowing from all of the sections 
read together).  
 193. See id. ¶¶ 102–131. 
 194. Id. ¶ 39. 
 195. Id. ¶ 108. 
 196. Id. ¶¶ 8–11. 
 197. Id. ¶ 20. 
 198. Corbett, supra note 104, at 68. 
 199. Id. at 67. 
 200. Fourie, 2005 (3) SA 429, ¶ 21. 
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According to Justice Cameron‘s analysis, it is the Constitution, rather 
than the boni mores, that requires incremental development to take 
place.
201
 Ultimately when the boni mores conflict with constitutional 
values, the values trump—but this does not negate the need to engage with 
those boni mores.
202
 It is easy to see how indirect application has come of 
age in the majority judgment. It seems clear that had it been a case of 
direct application, it would have looked no different.
203
 
D. Constitutional Court: Fourie 
When Fourie finally came before the Constitutional Court, both 
common law and legislative issues were on the table: the exclusion of 
same-sex marriages from the common law definition of marriage and the 
provisions of the Marriage Act, which explicitly exclude same-sex couples 
from marrying.
204
 The Court easily found that the absence of a provision 
for same-sex couples to marry amounted to a denial of equal protection of 
the law and unfair discrimination by the state, and turned to the question 
of remedy.
205
 
Counsel for the state contended that the Court could not indirectly 
apply the Constitution to the common law and develop the common law 
definition because only the legislature had the power to cure any 
substantial and non-incremental defect in the common law.
206
 Similarly, 
they maintained that the Court was not competent to restructure the 
institution of marriage in such a radical way because the issue was 
exclusively within parliament‘s competence and required the public‘s 
input due to its great importance.
207
  
Justice Albie Sachs, writing for the majority of the Constitutional 
Court, found it unnecessary to decide whether the Court had power to 
 
 
 201. Id. ¶ 23. See also id. ¶¶ 40–41. 
 202. Id. ¶ 108. 
 203. Since the issue of statutory provisions stipulating the heterosexual formula for marriage had 
not been brought before the court, the practical result of the judgment was that same-sex couples could 
not marry until legislation was passed to facilitate this. 
 204. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶ 15 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 205. Id. ¶¶ 60–117. According to Justice Sachs, writing on behalf of the majority of the court, 
equality does not eliminate or suppress difference, rather it means ―equal concern and respect across 
difference‖; it does not imply a homogenization of behavior, but the acknowledgment and acceptance 
of difference. Id. ¶ 60. ―The issue goes well beyond assumptions of heterosexual exclusivity,‖ but is 
rather concerned with the ―character of . . . society as one based on tolerance and mutual respect. . . . 
[where] [t]he test of tolerance is of . . . how one accommodates the expression of what is 
discomfiting.‖ Id. 
 206. Id. ¶ 143. 
 207. Id. ¶ 123. 
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develop the common law only in an incremental fashion, but in the same 
paragraph cited to an early instance of direct application to support the 
invalidation and striking down of appropriately challenged, inconsistent 
common law provisions.
208
 He also found that the public had already been 
extensively consulted by the Law Commission, which had drafted 
legislation that could be placed in front of parliament within a relatively 
short period.
209
 Hence, on both points the Constitutional Court is 
competent to act—the question is whether it should grant immediate relief 
to the applicants, or whether it should suspend the order of invalidity to 
give Parliament a chance to remedy the defect. 
Deciding in favor of the suspension order, Justice Sachs stressed that 
the issue involved a matter of status that required a secure remedy, which 
would be found in legislation.
210
 Also, in his view, the equality claims in 
question were best served by respecting the separation of powers and 
giving Parliament an opportunity to deal with the matter because not only 
are the courts responsible for vindicating constitutional rights, but the 
―legislature is in the frontline in this respect.‖211 The remedy he ultimately 
provided declared the common law definition of marriage invalid to the 
extent that it did not permit same-sex couples the status and benefits 
accorded to heterosexual couples, but he suspended the declaration of 
invalidity for twelve months from the date of judgment to allow 
Parliament to correct the defect.
212
  
 
 
 208. Id. The Court emphasized that in striking down the common law offence of sodomy it was 
not developing the common law but exercising a power under s. 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, which 
was an example of direct application of the Bill of Rights. But this case was heard under the interim 
Constitution, and also prior to Carmichele, which was the decisive case ―giving teeth‖ to indirect 
application, and hence, deliberately or inadvertently, charting the path of future jurisprudence. The 
instances where the Court had explicitly used direct application to strike out a common law rule are 
limited and occurred during the early years of the Court. In Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 
(CC) (S. Afr.), the Constitutional Court expounds on the section 8, direct horizontal application clause, 
but it is difficult to see how that analysis furthers the rubric of indirect application in Carmichele. For 
discussion of the Khumalo judgment, see Woolman, supra note 47. 
 209. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶¶ 125–131. 
 210. Id. ¶ 136. 
 211. Id. ¶ 138. Although there are different legislative options, ―this is an area where symbolism 
and intangible factors play a particularly important role. What might appear to be options of a purely 
technical character could have quite different resonances for life in public and in private.‖ Lesbian & 
Gay Equal. Project v. Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524, ¶ 139 (CC) (S. Afr.). See also 
Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶¶ 150–153. 
 212. Id. ¶ 161. Similarly, the omission of the words ―or spouse‖ from the Marriage Act was 
declared invalid to the extent of the inconsistency with the Constitution, and Parliament was given 
twelve months to cure the defect. Sachs further provided that should Parliament fail to correct the 
defects within the period, section 30(1) of the Marriage Act will be read as including the words ―or 
spouse‖ in the marriage formula. Id. Ultimately the Civil Union Act 17 was passed in 2006. For further 
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In a dissenting opinion on the question of remedy, Justice Kate 
O‘Regan disagreed with the suspension order, adding that the absence of 
suspension ―would not preclude Parliament from addressing the law of 
marriage in the future, and would simultaneously and immediately protect 
the rights of [same-sex] couples pending [such legislation].‖213 Her 
reasoning was that the question before the Court involved a rule of 
common law developed by the courts, so the responsibility for its remedy 
lay ―in the first place, with the courts.‖214 She stressed that in terms of 
Carmichele, the authority for accelerated, indirect application, it was the 
duty of the courts to ensure that the common law conformed to the 
Constitution.
215
 In her view, while the doctrine of separation of powers 
was important, it could not be used to avoid the obligation of a court to 
provide appropriate relief to successful litigants.
216
 Although it would have 
been desirable if the unconstitutional situation identified had been resolved 
by Parliament without litigation, this does not mean that the Court should 
not come to the relief of successful litigants simply because an act of 
parliament might be thought to carry greater democratic legitimacy. 
Justice O‘Regan wrote, ―The legitimacy of an order made by the Court 
does not flow from the status of the institution itself, but from the fact that 
it gives effect to the provisions of our Constitution.‖217 
Technically, the O‘Regan dissent engaged in indirect application, while 
the Sachs opinion suggested that direct application is competent, although 
 
 
analysis, see the entire issue, 23 S. AFR. J. ON HUMAN RTS. 407 (2007) (dedicated to discussion of 
sexuality and the law). 
 213. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶ 173. The Court has stated this on previous occasions as well. 
See, e.g., Zondi v. MEC for Traditional & Local Gov’t Affairs 2005 (4) BCLR 347, ¶ 123 (CC) (S. 
Afr.) (―Finally it must be borne in mind that whatever remedy a court chooses, it is always open to the 
legislature, within constitutional limits, to amend the remedy granted by the court.‖). 
 214. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶ 167. 
 215. In rejecting Sachs‘s argument for legislative choice and status, Justice O‘Regan stated that 
her proposed order would mean that there would be gay and lesbian married couples at common law 
whose marriages would be regulated by any new marital regime the legislature chooses to adopt:  
I cannot see that there would be any greater uncertainty or instability relating to the status of 
gay and lesbian couples than in relation to heterosexual couples. The fact that Parliament 
faces choices does not, in this case, seem to me to be sufficient for this Court to refuse to 
develop the common law and, in an ancillary order, to remedy a statutory provision, reliant on 
the common law definition, which is also unconstitutional. 
Id. ¶ 169. 
 216. Id. ¶ 170. O‘Regan writes that as necessary as it is that unconstitutional laws be removed 
from the statute books, it is equally necessary that provisions of the common law that are in conflict 
with the Constitution are developed in conformity with it. Id. 
 217. Id. ¶ 171. ―Time and again, there will be those in our broader community who do not wish to 
see constitutional rights protected, but that can never be a reason for a court not to protect those 
rights.‖ Id. 
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he declined to employ it.
218
 While by virtue of a basic agreement between 
both judgments in the formulation of the court order, both direct and 
indirect applications reach the same remedy, the reasons for the difference 
of opinion on the question of suspension are vital and go to the heart of 
institutional choice. 
The Sachs majority favored suspension of the order since it viewed the 
legislature as the frontline of law reform in a constitutional democracy.
219
 
The majority judgment gave particular weight to the fact that the case 
concerned an issue of status that required a stable remedy, which in Justice 
Sachs‘s opinion was a legislative remedy.220 In contrast, according to 
Justice O‘Regan‘s judgment, indirect application carried with it the 
positive injunction to transform common law found constitutionally 
wanting, making it imperative that courts grant a remedy.
221
 She asserted 
that the legislative process was not more legitimate than the judicial 
process, particularly in matters involving the common law and stressed, 
like Justice Cameron, that the common law and its reform are fully within 
the domain of the judiciary.
222
 
The case squarely presented the issue of separation of power and 
institutional choice. Whilst previous constitutional cases stressed that the 
positive obligation on the judiciary to transform the common law found 
constitutionally wanting must be counterbalanced against legislative 
primacy, O‘Regan‘s judgment took this a step further; it represents the 
first attempt to chisel out a clear jurisdictional boundary between the 
legislature and the judiciary.
223
 Using indirect application, she found a 
duty of the judiciary to vindicate the Constitution and grant a 
constitutional remedy.
224
 Hence, she refused the separation of powers 
argument, and with this, refused to delay relief for a year.
225
 She also 
confronted the institutional legitimacy argument, maintaining that 
legitimacy comes from the vindication of the constitution, not from the 
mere institution of the judiciary.
226
 However, she stressed in answer to the 
Osborne-Sprigman democratic critique, that this did not prevent 
Parliament from passing legislation that complies with the Constitution.
227
 
 
 
 218. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶ 121.  
 219. Id. ¶ 138. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. ¶¶ 152–153. 
 222. Id. ¶¶ 165–173. 
 223. Id. ¶¶ 170–171. 
 224. Id. ¶ 171. 
 225. Id. ¶ 170. 
 226. Id. ¶ 171. 
 227. Id. ¶ 167. 
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Here, there is a distinct change in the rhetoric associated with indirect 
application; indirect application, because of Carmichele, has urgency and 
bite and furthers the goals of direct and fundamental, not merely 
incremental, law reform. 
The disconnect between social norms and constitutional values is 
referred to in the earlier Cameron opinion and then again in the O‘Regan 
opinion. Justice O‘Regan wrote that the judicial duty to vindicate 
constitutional rights operates despite opposition.
228
 According to this 
analysis, judicial function is not to reflect boni mores or to change them, 
for even if social norms run contrary to the decision, the judiciary must not 
shirk responsibility or allegiance to the Constitution.
229
 The underlying 
notion is that even if this is an unpopular, controversial, and possibly 
combustive social issue, the judiciary cannot abstain. 
Philosophically, neither judgment seeks to insulate the private sphere 
as feared by first generation academics,
230
 nor does either use the language 
of common law incremental good. The case is a clear example of how far 
the distinction between direct and indirect application has come. Indirect 
application bears none of its original imprints on O‘Regan‘s version, but 
in fact carries a far more urgent obligation on the judiciary to transform 
the common law.
231
 It is easy to see how indirect application fulfills many 
of the functions of direct application such that the distinction, which had 
initially been so controversial and divisive, appears to have lost many of 
its original meanings and associations.  
V. CUSTOMARY LAW UNION 
In this Part, I will look at jurisprudence regarding judicial recognition 
of African customary law marriages and the function of the application 
debate. When applying the Constitution to African customary law, one is 
immediately confronted with historically subordinate relationship of 
African customary law to the common law which can be traced to the 
1927 Black Administration Act.
232
 The purpose of the Act was to re-
 
 
 228. Id. ¶ 171. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Supra note 1. 
 231. Although Sachs explicitly stated he did not have to decide whether adjudication is limited to 
the incremental, rather than fundamental, development of common law because of his suspension 
order, I take his citing of the sodomy case, Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (S. Afr.), to all but say that direct application and fundamental law reform 
are within the province of the judiciary. 
 232. T. W. Bennett explains that the act was introduced to re-establish traditional authority so that 
the chiefs would be better able to control the young. BENNETT, supra note 121, at 41. While the courts 
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establish traditional authority.
233
 It allowed customary law to be applied 
nationwide, but only in a separate system of courts constituted by 
traditional leaders and native commissioners.
234
 
By the 1980s, when it was clear that Apartheid was failing, the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act of 1988
235
 was passed and allowed both 
customary law and foreign law to apply in any court in the country without 
reference to race.
236
 Yet the Law of Evidence Amendment Act also 
excluded the application of customary law where it conflicted with public 
policy and natural justice.
237 
Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch contend 
that the fact that customary law was grouped together with foreign law is 
indicative of it being something outside the dominant common law 
system.
238
 They comment, ―The ‗public policy‘ to which the courts would 
refer was an embodiment of the sentiments of the small, dominant, white 
population in South Africa.‖239 
Yet the new constitutional era demanded that the relationship between 
African customary law, common law, and the Constitution be radically 
restructured.
240
 At the very least, African customary law now seems to 
 
 
of traditional leaders could apply only customary law, the courts of native commissioners had the 
discretion to apply either customary or common law. Post-Apartheid legislation in the form of The 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 recognizes marriages contracted before November 
15, 2000, which are valid at customary law and existing at the commencement of the Act. Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 2(1). Customary marriages conducted after November 15, 
2000 must comply with the following prerequisites: both prospective spouses must be above the age of 
eighteen years old, both must consent to be married to each other under customary law, and the 
marriage must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law. Id. ss. 
2(2), (3). See also S. AFRICAN LAW COMM‘N, HARMONISATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND 
INDIGENOUS LAW (DRAFT ISSUE PAPER ON SUCCESSION) (1998), http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ 
ipapers/ip12_prj108_1998.pdf. 
 233. BENNETT, supra note 121, at 42. Bennett writes that the regime was given its decidedly racist 
stamp by a rule that the jurisdiction of the courts of traditional rulers and native commissioners was 
only over blacks, and that only blacks could be subject to customary law. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
 236.  
Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous law in so 
far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty: Provided that 
indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public policy or natural justice: 
Provided further that it shall not be lawful for any court to declare that the custom of lobola or 
bogadi or other similar custom is repugnant to such principles. 
Id. s. 1(1). 
 237. BENNETT, supra note 121, at 43. 
 238. Chuma Himonga & Craig Bosch, The Application of African Customary Law under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning?, 117 S. AFR. L.J. 306, 308 (2000). 
 239. Id. 
 240. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. s. 39(2) (―[W]hen developing . . . customary law, every court . . . must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.‖); id. s. 39(3) (―The Bill of Rights does 
not deny the existence of any other rights . . . conferred by . . . customary law.‖); id. s. 211(3) (―The 
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occupy equal status to common law and is not subservient to common law 
values.
241
 But section 211(3) of the Constitution arguably elevates 
customary law above common law because courts are constitutionally 
obliged to apply ―customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary 
law.‖242 It is further perplexing to note that section 8(3) of the 
Constitution, which expressly provides for horizontal application, does not 
make explicit reference to the development of customary law, whilst the 
section 39(3) injunction to indirect application does refer to the 
development of both common and customary law.
243
 From this, some 
commentators conclude that indirect application, or development of 
customary law, is not an option envisaged by the Constitution.
244
 They 
further assert that it would undermine the status of customary law to hold 
that only it should be directly tested against the Bill of Rights in all 
cases.
245 
 
This part traces two distinct stages in the approach of common law 
courts to the question of the interaction between customary law, common 
law, and constitutional law. The first is characterized by the refusal of 
judges to grant recognition to African customary marriages.
246
 Only now, 
in post-Apartheid courts, the justification for non-recognition is no longer 
that African customary marriages are contrary to public policy, but that 
this type of complex law reform lies within the exclusive competence of 
 
 
courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law.‖). 
 241. See Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty. 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (S. Afr.). See also 
Crossley v. Nat’l Comm’r of SAP Servs. 2004 (3) All SA 436 (T) (S. Afr.). 
 242. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 211(3). This obligation is subject to three important qualifications: 
that customary law is applicable, that it is compatible with the Constitution, and that it has not been 
superseded by any legislation that specifically deals with customary law. With respect to the latter, 
customary law was treated as distinct from common law, where statutes automatically override all 
precedent, custom, and juristic writing. BENNETT, supra note 121, at 43. 
 243. ―According to the South African Law Commission, the indirect horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights contained in the 1996 Constitution would give the courts grounds for applying the so-
called ‗living law‘ instead of the official version to disputes before the courts.‖ Christa Rautenbach, 
Some Comments on the Status of Customary Law in Relation to the Bill of Rights, 14 STELLENBOSCH 
L. REV. 107, 110 (2003). 
 244. Himonga & Bosch, supra note 238, at 317. Himonga and Bosch ask,  
[W]hat will occur where the court finds that it is required to strike down or refer an offending 
customary law rule is not clear. If a rule of living customary law is struck down will the court 
apply a rule from official customary law (if there is such a rule) in its stead? If the court 
suspends the invalidity of a rule that it has elected to strike down to refer the matter to a 
competent authority to correct the defect, who would that authority comprise? 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 245. Id. at 316. 
 246. See id. at 309. 
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the legislature.
247
 This first stage can be characterized as deploying ―non-
application‖ of the Constitution to customary law in the sense that it is 
neither directly applying nor indirectly developing the common law. Yet 
the justification proffered is similar to that advocated by the original 
indirect application proponents. 
This discourse of non-recognition, in conjunction with non-application, 
changes in Mabuza v. Mbatha,
248
 after which non-application is no longer 
a viable judicial option, and subsequent judgments must negotiate the 
terrain between direct and indirect application.
249
 In contrast to the 
common law debate on application, where indirect application emerges as 
the dominant form, in African customary law jurisprudence, direct 
application dominates the discourse. In yet another twist, the implications 
of the Ngcobo dissent in the Bhe opinion are that indirect application, 
thought to be the more democratically deferent approach, signifies greater 
judicial willingness to intervene in the domain of culture
250
 (in the first 
generation, a case of no cause of action), whilst the consequences of direct 
application represent the more institutionally deferential argument that the 
Court lacks democratic legitimacy, empirical understanding, or 
institutional capacity and must leave the legislature to decide.
251
 However, 
in contrast to Fourie, the Constitutional Court did not grant a suspension 
order, but rather was determined to provide an immediate remedy.
252
 
A. Stage One: Non-application of the Constitution 
In Mthembu v. Letsela,
253
 the decedent died intestate leaving behind the 
appellant—with whom he had cohabited—and a daughter born of that 
relationship.
254
 The appellant brought an application for an order declaring 
the customary law of primogeniture, which generally excluded African 
women from intestate succession, to be declared invalid on grounds of 
inconsistency with the Constitution.
255
 She argued that the rule of 
customary law of succession discriminates against all black women and 
 
 
 247. Mthembu, 2000 (3) All SA 219, at 40. 
 248. 2003 (4) SA 218 (HC, Western Cape) (S. Afr.). 
 249. Id. at 32. 
 250. This is similar to O‘Regan‘s use of indirect application in her Fourie dissent in order to assert 
the institutional legitimacy of the courts over common law reform. See Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, 
¶ 169 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 251. Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 139 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 252. Id. ¶¶ 107–108. 
 253. 2000 (3) All SA 219 (A) (S. Afr.). 
 254. Id. ¶ 2. 
 255. Id. ¶ 4. 
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girls, along with all black children who are not the eldest, by excluding 
them from participation in intestate succession.
256
 She further argued that 
the rule of primogeniture be developed indirectly in terms of section 35(3) 
of the interim Constitution with due regard to the fundamental value of 
equality in order to avoid discrimination between legitimate and 
―illegitimate‖ children of the deceased.257 
On the facts, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that although there had 
been an agreement between the appellant and the deceased to marry, and 
bridewealth had been paid in part, the complete requirements for a 
customary union had not been completed.
258
 Consequently, the court found 
that the daughter was illegitimate.
259
 The court rejected arguments in favor 
of either direct or indirect application on three grounds: (1) the interim 
Constitution did not apply to the matter since it came into operation after 
the death of the deceased and the Constitution does not operate 
retroactively;
260
 (2) the interests of justice require the Constitution be 
applied retrospectively because an illegitimate child in customary law 
forms part of the family of the maternal grandfather who is obliged to 
provide for her and there can be no question of the child being thrown out 
of her home on the basis of her ―illegitimacy‖;261 and (3) this is not an 
appropriate case to develop the rule, given that it does not have the 
relevant information before it.
262
 The judge preferred that the development 
of the rule be left to the legislature after a process of full investigation and 
consultation.
263
 He concluded that ―to strike down the rule would be 
 
 
 256. Id. ¶ 10. 
 257. Id. Appellant argued that regulation 2(e) was ultra vires at common law, as ―it constitute[d] 
delegated legislation which may not be partial and unequal in its operation unless specifically 
authorized by the enabling Act.‖ Id. ¶ 13. In a statement that would later assume great importance, the 
court stressed that ―the regulation in issue did not introduce something foreign to Black persons . . . . 
[but] merely gave legislative recognition to a principle or system which had been in existence and 
followed . . . for decades.‖ Id. ¶ 23. The judge declared that because the deceased could still have taken 
steps to alter the devolution of his estate if he so wished and that the wishes of the deceased are still 
paramount in South African law, ―a regulation which respects that right [could not] be said to the [sic] 
unreasonable and ultra vires at common law.‖ Id. ¶¶ 23–24. 
 258. Id. ¶ 18. 
 259. Id. Appellant argued that Tembi was still the victim of gender discrimination because the law 
recognizes the rights of an illegitimate son, but not an illegitimate daughter. Id. ¶ 19. The court held 
that this proposition was incorrect as only a son born during the subsistence of a customary union 
between his mother and the deceased could succeed to the head of the household if there were no other 
male descendants. Id. ¶ 20. 
 260. Compare this to the approach taken by Judge Mahomed in Amod, where the cause of action 
also preceded the enactment of the Constitution. See Amod, 1999 (4) SA 1319. 
 261. Mthembu, 2000 (3) All SA 219, ¶ 37. 
 262. Id. ¶ 40. 
 263. Id.  
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summarily to dismiss an African institution without examining its essential 
purpose and content‖264 and cited a quote from the trial court: 
If one accepts the duty to provide sustenance, maintenance and 
shelter as a necessary corollary of the system of primogeniture . . . , 
I find it difficult to equate this form of differentiation between men 
and women with the concept of ‗unfair discrimination‘ as used in s 
8 of the Constitution. . . . It follows that even if this rule is prima 
facie discriminatory on grounds of sex or gender and the 
presumption contained in s 8(4) comes into operation, this 
presumption has been refuted by the concomitant duty of support.
265
 
 Consequently, the judge rejected all forms of application of the 
Constitution to both the common law and customary law, which he argued 
was within legislative domain.
266
 At the same time he put forward his 
construction of African customary law in a post-Apartheid age of 
constitutional pluralism.
267
 The judge‘s refusal to look at the actual 
consequences of his decision on the appellant is particularly striking. 
Instead, he was satisfied with the theoretical checks and balances 
contained in customary law. 
Mthembu can be seen as ideologically conservative—in the sense 
feared by the original proponents of direct application—because of its 
reluctance to intervene in a culture that is perceived by the court to have its 
own internal safety nets. For corroboration, the court uses the institutional 
competence argument to find that the judiciary does not have the requisite 
qualification to develop customary law and therefore should defer to the 
legislature.
268
 The result is that the applicant is left without a remedy.
269
 
 
 
 264. Id. ¶ 47.  
 265. Mthembu, 2000 (3) All SA 219, ¶ 11 (citing Mthembu v. Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T) (S. 
Afr.) (Le Roux, J.)). 
 266. Id. ¶ 40. 
 267. Id. ¶ 47. 
 268. Id. ¶ 40. 
 269. This argument resembles that found in Ismail v. Ismail, where the judge refused to recognize 
the consequences of a Muslim marriage, and Acting Judge Trengove‘s comments in his concurrence 
that recognition would be a retrograde step for the equality rights of women. Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) 
SA 1006 (A) (S. Afr.); id. at 1024, ¶ G. 
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B. Stage Two: Common Law and African Customary Law: Separate and 
Equal under the Constitution 
In Mabuza,
270
 an action for divorce, the plaintiff sought custody of the 
minor child and an order directing the defendant to pay maintenance.
271
 
The respondent argued that there had been no valid customary marriage 
between the parties.
272
 On the facts, the plaintiff argued that lobolo had 
been paid, and she regarded herself as married to the defendant.
273
 The 
only requirement that was not complied with was the formal integration of 
the bride into the groom‘s family.274 The plaintiff and defendant disagreed 
as to whether this was necessary for the marriage to be valid.
275
 The judge 
found that siSwati customary law has evolved over the centuries such that 
formal integration can be waived by agreement between parties.
276
 The 
case is important for how it defines the relationships between African 
customary law, common law, and the Constitution. 
Judge Hlophe set out his approach to the new legal hierarchy:  
The approach whereby African Law is recognised only when it does 
not conflict with the principles of public policy or natural justice 
leads to an absurd situation whereby it is continuously being 
undermined and not properly developed by courts which rely 
largely on ―experts‖.277  
He found this situation to be untenable given that the courts have a 
constitutional obligation to develop African customary law, both with 
reference to section 39(2) provisions and given the historical 
background.
278
 In his view, the starting point was to accept the supremacy 
of the Constitution and reason a priori that all law, including customary 
law, which is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid.
279
 As a result, 
he concluded that the ―approach which only recognises African law to the 
extent that it is not repugnant to the principles of public policy or natural 
justice is flawed‖ and unconstitutional.280 
 
 
 270. Mabuza v. Mbatha 2003 (4) SA 218 (HC, Western Cape) (S. Afr.). 
 271. Id. ¶ 1. 
 272. Id. ¶ 2. 
 273. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
 274. Id. ¶¶ 7–9. 
 275. Id. ¶¶ 11, 17. 
 276. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. 
 277. Id. ¶ 31. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. ¶ 32. 
 280. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] SOCIAL NORMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION  501 
 
 
 
 
Mabuza ushers in a new discourse, which refuses to subordinate 
African customary law to common law and public policy repugnance or, 
in fact, to common law at all. His reasoning seems to be influenced by two 
separate and related issues: first, the symbolic matter of the inferior status 
of African customary law to common law, and second, the contention that 
common law attitudes towards African customary law have resulted in the 
ossification of that law‘s development. Judge Hlophe declared that the 
approach, which only recognizes African customary law if it is not 
repugnant to public policy or natural justice, is flawed.
281
 He rejected the 
subjection of African customary law to the common law because African 
customary law does not work through old common law doctrines, but is 
answerable only to the Constitution, and the current structure of discourse 
had changed.
282
 Judge Hlophe defined a new starting point—the 
Constitution; any law inconsistent with it is invalid.
283
 He would intervene 
in the arena of custom if it ―cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny‖ since 
he views it to be parallel to common law and thus clearly within the 
judicial domain.
284 
 
It is helpful to look more closely at the way in which the application 
discourse functions here. Judge Hlophe associates the flexible standards of 
public policy and natural justice with the subservience to the common law 
apparatus, and ideologically refuses to subject African customary law to 
common law—a hierarchy associated with Apartheid.285 Consequently, he 
uses the application doctrine as a way to claim equal authority and space 
for African customary law. He asserts the equality of customary law to the 
common law by his willingness to invalidate it if necessary.
286
 On the 
particular facts of the case, he develops a customary rule based on 
empirical evidence of a changed practice.
287
  
 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. See id. ¶ 29–32. 
 283. Id. ¶ 32. 
 284. Id. ¶¶ 31–32.  
The starting point it [sic] to accept the supremacy of the Constitution, and that law and/or 
conduct inconsistent therewith is invalid. Should the Court in any given case come to the 
conclusion that the customary practice or conduct in question cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, an appropriate order in that regard would be made. 
Id. ¶ 32. 
 285. Id. ¶¶ 28–31. 
 286. Id. ¶ 32. 
 287. Id. ¶¶ 25–27 (finding that the custom of ukumekeza has evolved). 
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C. Stage Three: Constitutional Court Response and Bhe 
In the Bhe
288
 case, the question before the Court was whether an 
African woman, whose parents were married according to African custom, 
was entitled to inherit intestate property upon the death of her father.
289
 
The Constitutional Court examined two related issues: first, the 
constitutionality of the Intestate Succession Act and certain provisions in 
the Black Administration Act, which deal exclusively with intestate 
deceased estates of Africans,
290
 and second, and more significant to this 
part of the Article, ―the constitutional validity of the [unregulated 
customary law] principle of primogeniture in the context of the customary 
law of succession.‖291 The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Pius 
Langa endorsed the direct application of the Constitution to the customary 
law, while Justice Sandile Ngcobo‘s dissent favored indirect 
application.
292
 
Justice Langa, writing for the majority, distinguished between the 
concept of customary law contained in the acts and that which was 
intrinsic to the customary law system.
293
 He focused on the new place of 
African customary law in the constitutional system.
294
 That is, African 
customary law should be accommodated and interpreted in its own setting, 
not through the ―prism of the common law,‖ but with the proviso that 
customary law rules do not conflict with the Constitution.
295
 It follows that 
customary law must be interpreted by the courts as to whether they first 
and foremost answer to the contents of the Constitution since ―[i]t is 
protected by and subject to the Constitution in its own right.‖296 He 
explained that the approach taken by Apartheid legislators and judiciaries 
 
 
 288. Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.). Primogeniture is challenged 
on basis that precludes widows from inheriting as intestate heirs of husbands, daughters from 
inheriting from parents, younger sons from parents, and extra-marital children from fathers. The Court 
concludes that exclusion of women violates section 9(3) of the Constitution the right to human dignity, 
and other protected rights, as they are a particularly vulnerable group. Id. ¶¶ 91–93. 
 289. Id. ¶¶ 10–13. 
 290. Id. ¶ 3. 
 291. Id.  
 292. Id. ¶¶ 218–219. 
 293. Id. ¶ 41. 
 294. Id. Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution entrench respect for cultural diversity. S. AFR. 
CONST. 1996. ss. 30–31. Further, section 39(2) specifically requires a court interpreting customary law 
to ―promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.‖ Id. In a similar vein, section 39(3) 
states that ―the Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred byz . . . customary law‖ as long as they are consistent with the Bill of Rights. 
Id. Finally, section 211 protects those institutions that are unique to customary law. Id. 
 295. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 43. 
 296. Id. ¶ 41. 
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led to the ―fossilisation and codification of [African] customary law which 
in turn led to its marginalisation. . . . den[ying] it of its opportunity to grow 
in its own right and to adapt itself to changing circumstances.‖297 Yet 
Justice Langa stressed that customary law can change, and ―[a]djustments 
and development to bring its provisions in line with the Constitution . . . 
are mandated.‖298 Ultimately, the judge found that the legislative 
provisions were unconstitutional and ―cannot escape the context in which 
[they were] conceived.‖299  
Regarding the constitutionality of the customary law rule of 
primogeniture, Justice Langa focused on the society in which it operated 
as part of a ―system [that] had its own safeguards to ensure fairness in the 
context of entitlements, duties and responsibilities.‖300 However, the effect 
of changing circumstances—such as the fact that ―[m]odern urban 
communities and families are [no longer] structured . . . purely along 
traditional lines‖—means that customary law rules of succession are now 
void of the social implications which they historically had.
301
 Since 
―[n]uclear families have largely replaced traditional extended families[,] 
[t]he heir does not necessarily live together with the whole extended 
family,‖ but the rules of succession in customary law have not been given 
the space to adapt.
302
 Justice Langa found that the rule of primogeniture 
violated dignity and that the theoretical justification that the heir has a 
principled duty of support was not adequate justification.
303
 
In considering an appropriate remedy, Langa touched on the issue of 
the relationship between judicial and legislative roles in his consideration 
of three methods to deal with this unconstitutionality: (a) strike it down 
and leave it to the legislature (direct), (b) strike it down and suspend the 
declaration of invalidity (direct), or (c) develop the rules of succession 
(indirect).
304
 In rejecting the third method, he wrote that in order to 
develop customary law, the current content of the law must be determined 
 
 
 297. Id. ¶ 43. 
 298. Id. ¶ 44 (emphasis added; internal citation omitted). 
 299. Id. ¶ 61. 
 300. Id. ¶ 75. 
 301. Id. ¶ 80. 
 302. Id. ¶ 92. The Court made extensive reference to the Richterveld decision, where the Court 
noted that indigenous law is not a settled body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules, but 
rather by its very nature it evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life. Id. 
¶ 153. ―Throughout its history it has evolved and developed to meet the changing needs of the 
community.‖ Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty.  2003 (12) BCLR 1301, ¶ 53 (CC) (S. Afr.). However, 
the rules of succession in customary law have not been given space to adapt. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, 
¶ 157. 
 303. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580. 
 304. Id. ¶ 105. 
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prior to giving effect to the order.
305
 He emphasized, ―The difficulty lies 
not so much in the acceptance of the notion of ‗living‘ customary law, as 
distinct from official customary law, but in determining its content . . . 
against the provisions of the Bill of Rights.‖306 Yet another factor to be 
considered in granting a remedy was the perceived unreasonable lengthy 
period of time the legislature took to pass legislation.
307
 
Because of the material‘s complex nature, Justice Langa preferred to 
strike it out rather than develop it so that people in the position of the 
applicant were able to inherit pending the passage of legislation.
308
 
However, in order to avoid a lacuna in the law as a result of the 
invalidation, his order provided that estates that had previously devolved 
according to the rules in the Black Administration Act and the customary 
rule of primogeniture will now devolve according to the rules provided in 
the Intestate Succession Act.
309
 
The Ngcobo dissent is largely concerned with the nature of the remedy 
to be employed. Justice Ngcobo supported the development of the rule of 
primogeniture to bring it in line with constitutional rights.
310
 In many 
respects, his opinion begins where the majority ended—dealing with the 
problem of ascertaining the real customary rules, bearing in mind its 
evolving nature. To avoid looking at customary law through the lens of 
common law, he advocated looking at the social context in which African 
customary law originated.
311
 He stressed how different this context is 
compared to that of the Succession Act.
312
 In the traditional subsistence-
agricultural society, the conception of the successor as holder of property 
was distinct from that of individual ownership.
313
 Instead, the successor 
 
 
 305. Id. ¶ 104. 
 306. Id. ¶ 131 (citation omitted). 
 307. Id. ¶ 114. 
The Court was urged not to defer to the legislature to make the necessary reforms because of 
the delays experienced so far in producing appropriate legislation. This was an invitation to 
the Court to make a definitive order that would solve the problem once and for all. That there 
have been delays is true and that is a concern this Court cannot ignore. The first proposal by 
the Law Reform Commission for legislation in this field was made more than six years ago. 
According to the Minister, the need for broad consultation before any Bill was finalised has 
been the cause of the delays. Moreover, he was unable to give any guarantee as to when the 
Bill would become law. 
Id. ¶ 114. 
 308. Id. ¶¶ 114–116. 
 309. Id. ¶ 117. 
 310. Id. ¶ 139. 
 311. Id. ¶ 162. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. ¶ 159. 
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was understood to hold property in trust on behalf of the clan.
314
 On the 
question before the Court, he found that indigenous law discriminated on 
the basis of gender, and given the changed social and economic context, 
could not be justified.
315
 
In determining whether the rule should be developed, he stated that 
section 39(2) of the Constitution imposed an obligation on courts to 
develop indigenous law to bring it in line with the Constitution.
316
 To 
understand this injunction in the context of customary law, he insisted that 
Carmichele applies equally to the development of indigenous law, and 
further, the Carmichele obligation to develop is even more important in 
the indigenous law context because the Constitutional clauses together 
represent a commitment to the survival and development of customary 
law.
317
 This is because using the remedy of striking down ends a rule that 
many people still observe.
318
 
Justice Ngcobo‘s choice of indirect application was motivated by a 
concern both for the survival of indigenous law as well as the legitimacy 
of the Constitution.
319
 He argued that, where possible, a court should 
choose to develop, rather than strike out.
320
 He elaborated by providing 
two specific instances where the need to develop arises: (1) where there 
are changed circumstances, and (2) to bring the rule in line with the 
Constitution.
321
 It is this latter concept that is articulated in Carmichele.
322
 
Because it is not primarily concerned with changing social context, the 
latter notion therefore, by ascertaining what living law is, should not be an 
impediment to development.
323
 On the facts, he postulated that a judge 
does not need to know what the actual, lived rules governing 
primogeniture are to know that the rule, as applied in Bhe, needs to be 
developed.
324
 He thought the majority‘s substitution of the laws of the 
Intestate Succession Act would lead to the disintegration of indigenous 
law.
325
 He put forward his own remedy, which holds that, pending the 
passing of legislation by parliament, both the indigenous law of succession 
 
 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. ¶ 209. 
 316. Id. ¶ 212. 
 317. Id. ¶ 215. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. ¶ 216. 
 322. Id. ¶ 218. 
 323. Id. ¶ 216. 
 324. Id. ¶ 220. 
 325. Id. ¶ 229. 
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and the Succession Act should be applied subject to the requirements of 
fairness, justice, and equitableness.
326
 In the interim, the question of which 
system of law should apply must be determined by agreement among 
family members.
327
 However, he added a proviso: where there is a dispute, 
it should be resolved by the Magistrate‘s Court.328 
What is striking about both the majority and dissenting judgments is 
the lack of deference with which they appear to approach the institution of 
customary law. They argue that customary law has been constructed, 
tainted, and ossified, instead of adapting to a changing social context.
329
 
The majority judgment declares that it cannot develop customary law 
because it cannot ascertain what actual, lived customary law truly is.
330
 
Underlying this difficulty is the concern that this task is too complex for 
judicial deliberation, and by implication it is the wrong institution to do so. 
However, the majority‘s response to institutional inadequacy is not to 
defer judgment to the legislature, which it perceives as being unacceptably 
slow in passing legislation.
331
 Rather, the majority refuses to engage in the 
developmental task associated with indirect application, preferring to 
simply strike out the innocuous rule.
332
 The construction of legislative and 
judicial roles are somewhat altered in this scheme. Returning to the first 
generation of the debate, advocates of indirect application argued that 
common law rules should be developed, not stricken, given that large scale 
law reform was not in the domain of the judiciary.
333
 In that same debate, 
proponents of direct obligation argued that only direct application could 
ensure there were no law-free spaces.
334
 Yet here the majority judgment 
strikes down the customary rule as unconstitutional, refusing to develop it 
on grounds that it is ―the development‖ of the rule that is not within 
judicial competence.
335
 
 
 
 326. Id. ¶ 233. 
 327. Id. ¶ 239. 
 328. Id. ¶¶ 236–241. 
 329. Id. ¶¶ 86, 221. 
 330. Id. ¶ 112. 
 331. Id. ¶ 116. 
 332. Id. ¶¶ 110–113. 
 333. Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 334. It will be recalled that Justice Sachs in Du Plessis, particularly referred to customary law as 
an example of where indirect rather than direct application, was appropriate. Id. ¶ 189 (using the 
example of lobola to illustrate that direct horizontal application could require the Court to engage in 
wholesale striking down because of the violation of equality guarantees). In Du Plessis, Sachs favored 
the indirect approach, which ―would permit courts closer to the ground to develop customary law in an 
incremental, sophisticated and case-by-case way so as to progressively, rapidly and coherently to bring 
it into line with the principles of Chapter 3.‖ Id. 
 335. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶¶ 110–113. 
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Justice Ngcobo insisted that it is not necessary to know customary law 
in order to declare the customary rule, as framed in case law, 
unconstitutional.
336
 His understanding of the ideological-institutional axes 
is different because even if the Court lacks the requisite ability to ascertain 
actual, lived customary law, the Court can still develop the customary law 
rule as contained in case law. He was unconcerned with the counter-
majoritarian nature of judicial choice, or even the lack of institutional 
competence of the judiciary.
337
 Rather, his allegiance was to the survival 
of African customary law, which in his view meant that it must not be 
struck down.
338
  
In another twist, the case illustrates or opens up the distinction between 
direct and indirect application to different usages: while ―private‖ power is 
not immunized from scrutiny by either the majority or dissent, and hence 
the concerns of the first generation advocates of direct horizontal 
application are not met, the labels or methodologies of ―direct‖ and 
―indirect‖ now come to signify ―how‖ the Constitution or constitutional 
values will permeate customary law.
339
 Certainly, in Justice Ngcobo‘s 
opinion, indirect application displays a commitment to the evolution and 
survival of customary law; in this multicultural sense indirect goes even 
further than direct application. Direct application, on the other hand, can 
be said to reveal the limitation of liberal tolerance or judicial institutional 
competence. If engaging with the private is a question of degree, indirect 
application engages it in a way that direct will not. Correspondingly, 
indirect application signifies an increased judicial role, while direct 
application, with its remedial tool of striking out, often becomes the more 
institutionally deferent remedy.
340
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The question that asserts itself in this analysis is: why is indirect 
application the dominant form in common law adjudication, whilst direct 
application prevails under African customary law? Ultimately both 
common law jurisprudence under the rubric of indirect application and 
African customary law under the authority of direct application 
substantively take on social norms and refuse the privatization of 
 
 
 336. Id. ¶ 155. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. ¶ 215. 
 339. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580. 
 340. It will be recalled, that in the early debate, Sprigman and Osborne viewed direct application 
as an instance of gratuitous counter-majoritarianism. Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 77. 
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Apartheid‘s cloistered attitudes in the widest sense. Similarly, both 
judgments largely resist the institutional competence argument and refuse 
to wait for the legislature to perform, arguing that justice must be achieved 
in the cases before them.
341
 Perhaps, sixteen years into democracy, there is 
awareness that the legislative response to the project of actualizing rights 
is at best slow and convoluted.
342
 
When looking at Fourie and Bhe together, it appears that there is little 
difference between the two, other than the former‘s contention that it is 
engaging in indirect application, and the latter direct. It is arguable that the 
distinction makes no difference, and  
a distinction without a difference is a failure even if it‘s possible for 
everyone to agree every time on how to make it. Making a 
difference means that it seems plain that situations should be treated 
differently depending on which category of the distinction they fall 
into.
343
 
 Nonetheless, the question of direct versus indirect application is 
necessarily tied into conceptions of the equitability of the common law. As 
argued earlier, one of the original conceptions of direct horizontal 
application was sourced from a distrust of the common law‘s equitable 
unfolding. Proponents of indirect application were more concerned with 
common law stability and counter-majoritarianism in a post-Apartheid 
society.
344
 Both in form and substance, direct application was intended to 
disrupt common law incrementalism, whilst indirect application was 
thought to graft constitutional values onto an already largely equitable 
system. With this in mind, it is easy to see how the common law cases 
discussed in this Article are concerned with the continuity and legitimacy 
of that discourse, hence the move to indirect application and its concern 
with constraining legitimate avenues for constitutional values to alter the 
common law form.
345
 The starting point of the judgment in Bhe is the 
construal of the nature of African customary law as constructed and 
 
 
 341. Sachs‘s judgment in Fourie reveals limited deference to the legislature by allowing it twelve 
months to pass legislation, failing which the court order of invalidation automatically comes into 
effect. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶ 161. 
 342. Or as Cameron suggests in Fourie, perhaps the legislature does not want to be the decision-
maker of such socially contentious issues, and omits to pass legislation in order to force the judiciary 
into deciding the matter, such as in State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.), which 
declared the death penalty unconstitutional. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, ¶ 161 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 343. Kennedy, supra note 130, at 1349. 
 344. Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 77, at 50. 
 345. O‘Regan‘s dissenting judgment in Fourie, and Ngcobo‘s dissenting judgment in Bhe disrupt 
this paradigm, using indirect application to claim judicial non-deference and institutional legitimacy. 
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ossified by and under colonial law.
346
 From there it is an easy step to 
directly apply and declare the rule of primogeniture unconstitutional. 
Ultimately, even as the results in the cases of direct and indirect 
application might be the same, the discourse is different: common law and 
its processes are legitimated, whilst African customary law is 
deconstructed. One way to concretize this is to consider the two majority 
judgments in the Constitutional Court in both Bhe and Fourie: in Bhe, 
Justice Langa goes out of his way to state that the Constitutional Court 
does not have at its disposal sufficient knowledge and information 
regarding living customary law.
347
 In other words, the judiciary is 
institutionally incompetent. But according to the Fourie majority, it is not 
the competence of the Court that is at issue, but rather its legitimacy, given 
the status of the legislature as the forerunner in law reform.
348
 
Nevertheless, it would be remiss to overlook the wider significance of 
these groundbreaking cases—that a new common law and a new 
customary law are being created to meet the needs of a democratic post-
Apartheid state. Whilst Bhe and Fourie are concerned with creating the 
apparatus for this new project, both judgments are acutely aware of the 
dangers of backlash where constitutional values are so out of sync with 
those of the populace (or ―the nation,‖ as Justice Cameron puts it) that it is 
not the boni mores that are reconstituted by the constitutional values, but 
rather the constitutional project‘s loss of some of its legitimacy—or 
relevance.
349
 
 
 346. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 86 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 347. Id. ¶¶ 110–113. 
 348. Fourie, 2005 (3) SA 429 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 349. Id. ¶ 20. 
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